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Therapeutic Approach in
Moral Education: A Critical
Assessment

by Jan Hábl
Abstract:
This study aims to critically assess the socalled therapeutic approach in moral education,
which emerged in the postwar twentieth century,
in the western part of the world. The proponents
of the approach used different terms to express its
essence: value clarification method, or sometimes
the decision-making method or the critical thinking
method. These philosophies of education have the
common feature of a personalistic, non-directive,
or client-oriented approach to the individual.
Therefore, I will refer to them here as therapeutic.
Jan Hábl (doc, 2016, Charles University in Prague; PhD,
2009, University of Wales) is a professor of pedagogy at
universities in Hradec Králové and Ústí nad Labem (Czech
Republic) and a research fellow in Comenius Institute in
Prague.

There are many advocates, but some of the most
notable should be named: Carl Rodgers, Jean
Piaget, Lawrence Kohlberg, Sidney B. Simon,
Louis Raths, and Merrill Harmin. For a proper
understanding of these approaches, it’s necessary
to review first the cultural-ideological context of
their origin. After that I will analyze and evaluate their key tenets, which I consider problematic. Specifically, we will scrutinize these problems: (1) the problem of process at the expense
of content, (2) the problem of devaluation of the
educator’s authority, (3) the problem of blurring
of moral concepts and standards, (4) the problem
of value pseudo-neutrality and indoctrination,
(5) the problem of individualism, subjectivism,
and relativism.
Key words:
Moral, education, therapeutic, method, indoctrination.
Historical and cultural context
Education, in the sense of therapeutic clarification of values (and all related concepts), was in
many ways a reaction to the postwar crisis of values and culture in general. The coming generation openly distanced themselves from the “morals” of their parents. In addition to freedom of
expression, emancipation of human rights, and
emphasis on autonomy, the prevailing sentiment
of the flower children was resistance towards the
“stale” culture that priggishly preached, commissioned, and taught. The culture of their fathers—
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because of the horrors of war that were still fresh
in their memories—had lost its moral legitimacy
and become more of a source of shame than
something to pass along pedagogically. From
such a background it was not surprising, therefore, that in the 1960s there arose a method that
emphasized discussion, openness, engagement,
no guidelines, and so on. The goal of the method
was neither the formation nor transmission of
any kind of specific “bag of virtues,” in the words
of Lawrence Kohlberg, or other moral material; it
was indoctrination, which was considered one of
the cardinal defects of all traditional educational
approaches.1 Teachers and educators of this new
type were given the task of helping students
think independently and critically, based on the
psychological assumption that if the individuals
themselves identified their own values, the internalization of those values would be easier and
more durable than if they were mediated by some
adult. The students were thus guided to discover,
classify, and develop their own values, that is, to
construct their own moral universe.
Experimental findings by developmental
psychologists such as Piaget and Kohlberg conveniently arrived just in time.2 Although their
theories of the moral and cognitive development
of the individual were not originally intended to
be educational, their application to pedagogy was
soon found. Different variations of Kohlberg’s famous micro-story dilemmas were used in lessons
as a tool for clarifying moral categories and values, a tool which was expected to both move the
students to a higher stage of moral development
and teach them independent moral judgment
and argumentation.
How does the method work in didactic practice? For illustration, I present two mini-stories:
Kohlberg’s now famous “Heinz’s Dilemma” and
“Sharon’s Dilemma” from the just-as-well-known
teacher’s handbook of Simon and his colleagues:3
A fatally ill woman lived in Europe. She suffered from a special kind of cancer. There existed a medicine that was recently discovered
by a pharmacist from the same town. To produce the medicine was very expensive, and
the pharmacist charged ten times more than
it cost him to make. Heinz, the husband of
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the sick woman, borrowed from everyone he
could and still had only half of the cost of the
medicine. He begged the pharmacist to lower
the price or allow him to pay it in installments. But the pharmacist wouldn’t budge.
Desperate, Heinz broke into the pharmacy at
night and stole the medicine.
Sharon and Jill were best friends. One day
they went shopping together. Jill was trying
on a sweater, when she suddenly put her jacket
on over it and left the store. The guard arrived
immediately afterwards, stopped Sharon and
asked the name of her friend who had fled the
store. At the same time, she threatened to call
the police if Sharon wouldn’t give the name.

The questions for discussion are obvious: Was
Heinz’s theft wrong or not? Should Sharon betray her friend or not? The discussion has to be
well-controlled didactically in order to fulfill its
task. Therefore, the authors present the following instructions. (1) Recapitulate the basic facts
of the story and ask a clear yes/no question. (2)
Give the students enough time to think through
the question and answer independently, ideally
in writing, and with justification. (3) Next, the
students say their answers aloud. If it happens
that most of the group agree, S. B. Simon recommends adding “balancing” information. For
example, if most of the class vote for giving the
name, the teacher can draw attention to the implications that this judgment would have on the
girls’ friendship, or bring a new variable into the
story—for example, what if Jill was from a weak
social background, and so on. (4) The teacher is
to lead the discussion in a fundamentally non-directive manner. No interfering unless necessary,
only steering it by means of questions—either
stimulating (if the discussion lags), or regulatory
(if the discussion gets off track) or clarifying (to
break down concepts or motives, etc.). Teachers
must also avoid the temptation to express their
own opinions (even though the students request
it) because that usually ends the discussion. (5)
The conclusion of the discussion should contain
a summary of the arguments (for and against),
as well as a re-stating of the beginning and ending opinions. Did the students change their view?

pological assumption of the innate goodness of
For what reason? And so on. Of course, the stohuman nature, the belief that people are unprobries and strategies can also be subject to thematic
lematically good—both ontologically and morchanges and adapted to the age and circumstancally. In the 20th century we first saw this domies of the group.
The method spread quickly and gained popunance of process over content in Carl Rogers’
larity. In addition to Simon’s handbook, which
personalistic concept of client-centered therapy.
became a bestseller, many other similar textbooks
Rogers says that people should accept themselves
were published. By the 1980s, however, the first
as “streams of becoming” in a life-long process
problems and criticisms had appeared. I will not
of self-actualization. Fully actualized individuals
here critique Kohlberg’s
would then see themselves
theory as a diagnostic tool
as a “fluid process, not a
Education, in the sense of
for identifying stages of
fixed and static entity […],
moral development (otha continually changing
therapeutic clarification of
ers have already done that),
constellation of potentivalues (and all related concepts),
but rather I will present a
alities, not a fixed quanwas in many ways a reaction to
critique of the didactic aptity of traits.”6 Later Rogers
the
postwar
crisis
of
values
and
plication.
explicitly states that the
culture in general.
Critics admit that this
process of self-realization
method brought about
applies to education as
some contribution to the moral educational dismuch as to therapy. “The teacher,” says Rogers,
cussion. If it is used prudently, that is, with sen“becomes a facilitator in the process of the stusitively chosen topics appropriate to the age and
dents’ self-definition […], a resource-finder […]”.
maturity of the children, circumstances, etc., this
He would want the quality of his relationship to
method can help make them sensitive to moral
the group to be such that his feelings could be
reality, sometimes even bringing them to a first
freely available to them, without being imposed
“awakening” —from, for example, the typical
on them or becoming a restrictive influence on
adolescent egocentrism, or even narcissism. From
them.”7
the viewpoint of the content of the selected topThis emphasis was enthusiastically corroboics, this method proved to be very attractive,
rated by many educators. William Glasser, for exespecially in the critical teen years—what adoample, in his book School Without Failure, bluntly
lescent isn’t interested in topics like sex, drugs, recondemns education aimed at specific moral
lationships, murders, or cannibalism (eating the
content as preaching: “We teach mindless conforlast survivor of a shipwreck on a deserted island).
mity to school rules and call the conforming child
Non-directive and group strategies entertain, en‘responsible.’”8 Simon, Howe, and Kirshenbaum
gage, or activate and thus motivate and stimulate
speak in a similarly unequivocal way when they
students—all results that are seen as the greatest
say that contents of a traditional curriculum are
didactic currency of this approach. But the criti“out-dated, moralistic” and strive after the “incism is massive.4
culcation of adult values into the youth,” and as
such are “indoctrination.” They, in contrast, seek
a higher goal, “the facilitation of the process of
Process at the Expense of Content
moral judgment.”9 The same appeal comes from
This therapeutic approach to moral education suffers, above all, from the “subordination of
the constructivist camp. A school that would prescontent for the benefit of the process,” says James
ent any kind of “objective morality” is compared
Hunter: The presentation of certain moral conto an “army camp,” and the teachers to “drill sertent (content-based instruction) is secondary and
geants.” Proper education should consist of drawcompletely overshadowed by questions about
ing out values only “as the need arises,” say Rheta
the “process whereby morality is acquired.”5 The
DeVries and Betty Zan. They continue, “we are
talking here about a process and not a product. In
ideological source of this approach is the anthroPro Rege—March 2018
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this process, children wrestle with questions, what
to believe to be good and bad, right and wrong.
They form their own opinions and listen, listen
to the opinions of others. They construct their
own morality out of daily life experiences.”10 The
last thing a teacher should do is to “dictate moral
norms to the children.”11 Instead, a teacher should
“cooperate with the children by trying to understand their reasoning and facilitating the constructive process.”12
However understandable the resistance to traditional moral content is, and however welcome
the appeal for a helpful pedagogical climate, the
unilateral emphasis on the procedural side of
moral formation has had the effect over time of
emptying the contents of moral education as such.
The logic of the problem is simple: If the teacher
only therapeutically “recognizes, accepts and validates”13 students’ moral feelings and perceptions
without resorting to criticism (because it would
improperly interfere with the students’ process
of self-actualization), it’s inevitable that sooner or
later the teacher will agree with a completely immoral construction on the side of the student, a result which has also been confirmed in pedagogical
practice. Thomas Lickona recalls, from his clinical
research, the experience of a 9th- grade teacher who,
within the framework of ethical education, used
the technique of “voting on values.” The teacher
began the discussion with the question “Who of
you has ever stolen something from a store?” Most
of the students raised their hands. “Don’t you
think that stealing is bad?” Lickona comments
that the teacher forgot for a moment that such a
question violates the rule of value neutrality. “We
have a right to material things,” answered one of
the students, and the others nodded in agreement.
The teacher remained clueless.14
In addition to similar narrative testimonies,
there are many empirical studies that unsurprisingly support the idea that the suppression of the
content of education leads logically to its emptying of content, and ultimately to its malfunctioning.15 If the individual is not exposed to moral
content, there is nothing to develop; moral development simply does not appear.

4
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Devaluation of the Authority of the Educator
The imperative of therapeutic non-instruction is not only a matter of the teachers’ didactic
manner or conduct in the classroom; it basically concerns their social role. Proponents of the
methods described above encourage educators
to programmatically abdicate their traditional
role as ones who instruct, interpret, and present
moral content. We have seen a shift in the understanding of their role—teachers should act as facilitators or consultants, sometimes as assistants.
They still have the responsibility of organizing
classroom activities and academic discipline, but
the way of accomplishing it is different under the
therapeutic conception. In 1963 Jean Piaget said
that the “imposition of the authority” of an adult
is, in an educational context, “absurd” and “immoral.” In his judgment, an adult should only be
an “elder collaborator and, if he has it in him, a
simple comrade” to children.16
The same philosophy applied in Kohlberg’s
experimental community (Just Community)—
“students and teachers participate equally in the
creation and enforcement of rules.”17 Parents are
also encouraged to take the same approach: “To
achieve [the] parental goal of raising responsible
children who grow into responsible men and
women, parent-child relationships need to be
based on democratic principles […] of mutual
respect and equality.”18 To this, James Hunter
observes that the term “democracy” is used here,
but it is losing its specific historical meaning. The
original—Greek—usage of the term expressed
a way of organizing the political life of a society where the roles and relational responsibilities between the people (démos) and those who
lead them, were defined in a concrete way. But
educational therapeuticians use the term democracy without that context, and here it describes
the process of social organization without any
further identification. Thus, it becomes a code
or charm legitimizing the right of individuals to
participate and make decisions in any context.19
The consequences are predictable. The established structure of pedagogical authority loses its
social significance.

from their tendency towards wrong behavior and
Blurring of Concepts and Standards
also to motivate them towards correction, when a
The growing reluctance to convey any kind
wrong has been committed. But this potential is
of moral content, however objective, accompadependent on a shared consensus on the concepts
nied by the phenomenon of weakened teacher
of good and evil. By eliminating it, educators and
authority to safeguard the content, had the effect
therapists have made the concept of guilt powerof eroding moral terminology and, ultimately,
less and forbidden. The guilty one needs therapy,
moral standards as such. As in theory, so in pracnot punishment.
tice, the normative distinctions for seeing and
Hunter adds that neologisms such as the
clarifying good from evil were lost. The concepts
word prosocial are an unconcealed attempt to
of good and evil, right and wrong, did not comavoid the encumbrance of
pletely disappear, but they
the old moral categories.23
were redefined, a result
If
the
individual
is
not
exposed
that caused a fatal confuIn principle, the meaning
to moral content, there is
sion of terminology and
remains the same—sowas a source of misundercially positive or negative
nothing to develop; moral
standing.
behavior matches with the
development simply does
When, for example,
statement “what you did
not appear.
Kohlberg talks about mois good/bad,” but the hard
rality or immorality, these
emotional tip of the conare always relative terms, defined according to
cepts is broken off, and in addition the teachers
the level of moral judgment the individuals are
are enabled to distance themselves from termicapable of using in this or that period of their
nology that sounds judging or condemning. This
development. So as people evolve and become
phenomenon is well illustrated by the fact that
more “moral,” their morality is not the same as
the frequent use of the term prosocial didn’t used
becoming good. For example, if selfishness or
to be contrasted in literature with the word evil,
other character flaws appear in the judgment or
nor with antisocial. Rather, it was contrasted with
behavior of individuals, these are considered the
the somewhat amorphous word negative, in disresult of developmental or cognitive immaturity,
cussions about the deficiencies of pro-socialism,
or general inadequacy in their cognitive funcbut never to talk about evil.
tionality.20 Thus, the concept of good and evil has
If the moral concepts still appear in linguistic
usage, they do so only as categories of meaning
lost its ontological status, and with that also its
that individuals construct on the basis of their
objective meaning, and gradually also its meanexperience. Teachers, then, have the task of eningful referential framework in language, a loss
couraging students in that construction of moral
that Alasdair MacIntyre very aptly pointed out.21
reality, for example, by programmatically creatIn the therapeutic context, the concepts of
ing the opportunity for students to vote on rules
good and evil have slowly become outdated and
for classroom behavior or the values that will beincorrect, precisely because they have lost their
come the code of the group. But what happens
ability to relate to anything that would be conwhen the students—in their predictable invensidered as moral reality. Adam Philips notes
tion and creativity—vote, say, that someone who
that the therapeutic approaches have literally
doesn’t cheat is a “chicken” or maybe that they
developed a “phobia” to the word evil.22 I have
don’t wish to do certain school activities that repersonally observed a similar fate for the word
quire effort, such as grammar lessons or PE, on
guilt. The fact that there is a pathological form
the grounds that these activities don’t belong to
of this “emotion” has led to its stigmatization
their value system?
and the subsequent neglect of its healthy form.
The obfuscation of moral language is also
At the same time, the psychological strength of
evidenced by pedagogical practice based on the
guilt is, in terms of healthy moral development,
therapeutic approach. Critics point out that
irreplaceable. It has the “power” to save people
Pro Rege—March 2018
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the fundamental misgivings and dangers of the
method of moral dilemmas consist in their implicit relativization of moral principles. If students are programmatically exposed to unsolvable moral situations, they can get the impression
that all morality is “unsolvable,” i.e., problematic,
controversial, and ultimately relative. Students
who are confronted with one extreme situation
after another in which it isn’t clear whether they
should steal, lie, kill, or eat each other, in the end
become convinced that concepts such as good
and evil are completely vague—evidence of a
very sophisticated form of indoctrination because
it is carried out on a latent level.24 But is the starting point of the premise of this approach correct?
Is it possible to apply conclusions derived from
extreme situations to non-extreme situations?
From abnormal to normal? From exceptional to
common? Let us consider the example of Heinz’s
dilemma. In a life and death situation, stealing
seems acceptable, even moral. What would it
be for a person who puts morals (not stealing)
above human life? Does it follow from these extremes that stealing is permissible—even under
ordinary (or all) circumstances? The answer is
obvious (at least I hope so). And I believe that
neither Kohlberg nor any other supporters of the
critical method would agree with a conclusion of
unrestrained robbery. Nevertheless, the method
of moral dilemmas really leads to such a conclusion, even if the teacher is not aware of it.
Kilpatrick25 wonders how a dilemma about
theft could help young teenagers overcome the
temptation to steal money from their parent’s
wallet. He says that most of the moral situations faced by both children and adults are not
dilemmas: most moral choices are unambiguous.
We simply have to do what we know we should
do, and not do what we know we shouldn’t.
The time spent in school would be much better used by considering (and practicing) virtues
such as friendship, loyalty, and honesty rather
than focusing on unsolvable situations where
truthfulness seems wrong, friendship is separated
from honesty, and cannibalism is legitimized.
Kilpatrick further notes that the method of dilemmas, especially when applied to children at
an early stage of moral and cognitive develop6
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ment, is “woefully inadequate,” because it comes
out of the assumption that children already have
the “ABCs of morality,” and are therefore able to
cope with questions requiring a higher level of
moral judgment.26 In other words, Kilpatrick is
arguing that before children are exposed to moral
complexity (remember Sharon: “Is it right to be
loyal to a friend, or truthful to the authorities?”),
they should be taught the basics of morality (“Is
it right to steal this sweater?”). If that doesn’t happen, the youth are put into moral confusion because they are instilled with the preconceptions
that (a) suppress the basic moral intuition that
some things are really and unproblematically
good and some bad; and (b) lead to a contradiction between moral theory and moral practice.
However possible it is to instill and hold the theory of the relativity of moral norms, it cannot be
meaningfully applied in practice. We start teaching children from the time they’re in the sandbox that there are some things they cannot do to
others, and we say the same thing to criminals
in court.
Value Pseudo-neutrality and Indoctrination
Critics of therapeutic pedagogy point to the
fact that, in spite of their claim that the therapeutic approach is completely value-neutral, the
reality is the opposite. Kilpatrick presents an example of a favorite didactic strategy, “VV,” which
is Value Voting.27 The exercise begins with innocent questions like “How many of you like to
go for walks in the countryside?” or How many
of you love picnics?” or “How many of you love
yogurt?” But soon there appear questions like
“How many of you approve of premarital sex?”
or “Which of you are for legalizing abortion?” or
“How many of you are in favor of having homosexual couples married by priests, ministers, and
rabbis?” Kilpatrick points out that the authors of
the method have made no effort to separate the
heavy-value questions from the light ones. They
are intertwined as though there were no significant differences between them. The exercise is designed to give young people the impression that
“all values are questions of personal taste—as in
the case of yogurt,” says Kilpatrick. This kind of
design is not only not neutral, it is “indoctrinat-

is nothing more practical than good theory. If,
ing” because it deliberately and somewhat dehowever, the theory is dubious, the practical conceitfully instills the doctrine of value relativity.
sequences will be dubious too, even though the
Whether or not it is the teachers’ intention, if this
way is lined with good intentions.
method is used in pedagogical practice, it does
Not only the teacher but also the student is
indoctrinate (although students/teachers usually
outwitted here. They were promised a tool to
are not even aware of it).
“stimulate” moral thinking, which would lead
Proponents of the therapeutic method unto greater moral competence, but in reality they
derstandably don’t like to be associated with
were subjected to the process of methodological
such a—for them almost vulgar—word and
relativization of values. It
vehemently defend themis woven into the theraselves.28 Indeed, resistance
In the therapeutic context, the
peutic textbooks, not in a
to indoctrination was one
concepts of good and evil have
neutral way but skillfully
of the central motives of
(and probably unintenthe alternative approach.
slowly become outdated and
tionally) hidden. Despite
But the problem is that
incorrect, precisely because
the rhetoric of value neuthey defined the term inthey have lost their ability to
trality that it proclaims in
doctrination very vaguely.
relate to anything that would
theory, practice shows that
It didn’t occur to them that
be considered as moral reality.
the therapeutic educator is
they also held a set of speanything but neutral.
cific values and doctrines
that they perforce communicated to children
Individualism, Subjectivism, Relativism
by whatever indirect method. Once the term is
In light of what has been said, it is unsurprisdefined, it becomes clear that their approach fuling that therapeutic pedagogy has earned accufills every criteria of indoctrination. The definisations of moral subjectivism, accompanied by
tion of Downey and Kelley, to which Kohlberg
individualism and eventually leading to moral
referred in one of his apologies, is an illustration
relativism. Conservative theoreticians and pracof the problem. The triad of indoctrinating criteticioners of education have been thoroughly
ria—questionable content, questionable method,
heard from in this respect. See, for example,
questionable goals—is so general that even its
Kilpatrick’s bestseller, Why Johny Can’t Tell Right
proponents fall into it. They communicate notoFrom Wrong, first published in 1992. In the title,
riously questionable content or doctrine—values
the author makes a deliberate reference to the
are relative. They use questionable methods—the
earlier book by Rudolf Flesch, Why Johny Can’t
therapeutists’ preferred non-directive methods of
Read. In it, Flesch clarifies the reason for the failteaching. Non-directiveness, however, doesn’t
ure of certain didactic experiments carried out in
guarantee anything. Teachers may (and often
America in the postwar years. Briefly, the tradido) indoctrinate in a non-directive way. That
tional phonetic method of language teaching was
is, in effect, an effective trick. Intentional? asks
replaced by the “look-say” method, in which the
Kilpatrick.29 I won’t be as mistrustful as my colfocus of reading acquisition was transferred from
league here. I use the adjective “effective” as opteachers to students. The authors of the project
posed to “intentional” because I am not presumpromised greater engagement of students, which
ing that there is any premeditated or manipulawould lead to more effective acquisition of readtive intent. On the basis of my own pedagogical
ing skills. The reality was just the opposite, and
experience and personal interaction with fellow
the project was a total failure, but before it endteachers, I have come to the conclusion that few
ed (for a certain time it had the approval of the
teachers actually seek to relativize moral values
federal authorities), it produced a whole generaon the part of their students. Rather, I think that
tion of nearly illiterate “readers.” Kilpatrick says
users of the therapeutic method simply haven’t
that something similar happened in the area of
anticipated the implications of their theory. There
Pro Rege—March 2018
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moral education. In his judgment, the dramatic
decline in moral literacy, which can not only be
documented statistically but also seen with the
naked eye, is the consequence of implementing a
bad method. A whole generation of children have
been fooled by its moral relativism and are now
unable to recognize the good from the bad.
Proponents of therapeutic pedagogy defend
themselves against the accusation of relativism.
They say that their method “definitely promotes
the values of thinking, feeling, choosing, communicating, and acting” as well as “rationality,
justice, creativity, autonomy, and equality.”30 Alfie
Kohn denounces the “rampant individualism and
self-assurance” that threaten society as a whole
and argues for “community cooperation” as a key
goal of moral education.31 Abraham Maslow similarly explains that “valuelessness” is the “greatest
disease of our time.”32 The term democracy also often appears as a non-negotiable value that should
be promoted by moral or civic education. (There
is even a subject called Education to Democracy
or Democratic Thinking—as opposed to totalitarian thinking). The same goes with respect, tolerance, empathy, and the so-called Golden Rule.
So, no relativism?33
It is good, however, to ask all these sets of
values these questions: Where are they coming
from? On what ontological basis do they stand?
How are they anchored or validated? One way
to avoid meta-ethical problems is simply to assert that they are values of the type of universal maxims or ideals that are self-validating or
self-evident, and that no further justification is
needed. But such an evasive maneuver doesn’t
work in education. From the earliest age, children are wired in such a way as to need to know
the reasons for their actions, or the actions required of them. The instruction “you should” do
this or that, or behave in this way or that, calls
forth a child-like natural and unaffected desire
to know why. It’s true that there are “why” questions and developmental stages that really don’t
need an answer, such as “Why shouldn’t I touch
the burner?” But others literally cry out for an
answer: “Why should I be brave?” “Why must I
control myself?”
Most educators know this fact very well; and
8
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therefore, if possible, they look for good answers
or fundamentals, which would give meaningful
justification for moral values and rights—including therapeutic educators. But on what basis?
Moral ideals are rooted “neither in the conventions of social life or public discourse, nor in an
external or transcendent standard inherited from
any particular moral tradition,” explains Hunter;
and, he continues, “rather, these ideals are rooted
in the rights (the desires, feelings, needs and potentialities) of the autonomous individual. The
self, in brief, is both the source of all moral sensibility and the final object of moral accountability.”34 Rodgers can in many ways be considered
the father of this concept:
The individual increasingly comes to feel that
the locus of evaluation lies within himself.
Less and less does he look to others for approval or disapproval; for the standards to live
by; for decisions and choices. He recognizes
that it rests within himself to choose; that the
only questions that matters is “Am I living
in a way that is deeply satisfying to me, and
which truly expresses me?”35

Elsewhere he adds,
Everyone possesses the capacity to expand, extend, become autonomous, develop, mature.
[Moral capacity] exists in every individual
and awaits only the proper conditions to be
released and expressed. [...] Whether one calls
it a growth tendency, a drive toward self-actualization, or a forward-moving directional
tendency, it is the main-spring of life.36

In psychotherapeutic circles, Maslow speaks
similarly about people. Everyone has an “inner
core,” which “as much as we know of it so far, is
definitely not ‘evil,’ but is either what we adults in
our culture call ‘good’ or else it is neutral,” he explains.37 “Self-realization” and “self-fulfillment”
are, in his judgment, “instinctive.” Let Maslow
speak more extensively about human nature:
Man demonstrates in his own nature a pressure towards fuller and fuller Being, more
and more perfect actualization of his humanness in exactly the same naturalistic, scientific
sense that an acorn may be said to be “pressing

ought to be.”44 In other words, a value can become one’s own only through choice.
Pedocentrism of this type necessarily leads
to moral subjectivism and relativism, as is well
illustrated by the handbook of one of the therapeutic education programs with the title Growing
up Caring. Let’s consider two examples. In the
chapter on cheating in school, a student discovFathers of liberal education like Rousseau
ers a picture of a girl during an exam looking
would have rejoiced: no molding, no teaching, perover the shoulder of her classmate, with the acmission, letting the potential itself be actualized…
companying text: “Cheating, in any form, is
What potential? “Creativeness, spontaneity, selfbad for your self-esteem.”
hood, authenticity, caring
In another chapter in the
for others, being able to
A whole generation of children
book is a photograph of a
love, yearning for truth are
have been fooled by its moral
young girl who is stealing
embryonic potentialities
relativism and are now unable
from a store, while the next
belonging to his speciesto recognize the good from
picture shows two other
membership just as much
the bad.
people watching her and
as are his arm and legs and
recording it on camera.
brain and eyes.”39
The accompanying text says, “One way to test
The therapeutic educational concepts are,
the impact a decision will have on your feeling of
in their theory, true echoes of this anthropolself-worth is to imagine a picture being taken of
ogy. Again and again we read that “learning is
you implementing your decision.”45 The ethical
a process whereby meaning, ethical or otherwise, must be actively invented and reinvented,
argument of these instructions is clear—the chilfrom the inside out.”40 Or, write other authors,
dren are not led to believe that cheating or stealing are objectively wrong because they violate a
“The individual who is autonomously moral foluniversal law. Cheating is wrong because it calls
lows moral rules of the self. Such rules are selfforth an unpleasant feeling or threatens the selfconstructed, self-regulating principles”41 —hence
confidence of an individual. Such an argument is
the didactic emphasis on autonomous decisionalmost amusing to someone who grew up under
making and choice, which are so characteristic of
a totalitarian regime in the seventies and eightthis kind of education. True values “represent the
ies. In a culture deformed by Communist ideolfree and thoughtful choice of intelligent humans
ogy, people felt downright happy if they could
interacting with complex and changing environmanage to steal from the state-owned property,
ments.”42 But the values must be chosen freely,
or at least get around some law. After all, the best
else they’re not “right”; or, at least, they are “chopeople—from a moral perspective—were usually
sen from among alternatives,” but mainly, “after
“illegal” or in prison or exile. Things are different
independent consideration.” The imperative for
now in both the East and the West. The “feeling”
free choice has become so inviolable that educaargument no longer works today—the number of
tors have been encouraged to “help the children
individuals whose self-esteem would be lowered
look for value, as long as [emphasis mine] the chilby being exposed as a person who committed an
dren make the decisions. It is also possible that
unethical act is rapidly declining everywhere.
the children decide not to develop values. The
Subjectivism, which is behind the therapeuteachers’ responsibility is to support even such
tic concepts of pedagogy, has a direct connection
a decision.” 43 Kohn adds pregnantly, “children
with the “cultures” of ethical utilitarianism and
must be invited to reflect on complex issues, to
emotivism (sometimes called expressionism). In
recast them in the light of their own experience
utilitarianism, moral discourse determines the
and questions, to figure out for themselves—and
logic of expediency and usefulness; in emotionwith one another—what kind of person one
toward” being an oak tree, or a tiger can be
observed to “push toward” being tigerish, or a
horse toward being equine. Man is ultimately not molded or shaped into humanness or
taught to be human. The role of the environment is ultimately to permit him or help him
to actualize his own potentialities.38
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alism, the logic of psychological well-being. In
both cases, it is the individual I who arbitrates
moral prudence. In this frame of reference, the
most important moral act is that of choice, making a decision—not a decision for something, just
making a decision, period, and deciding it yourself—Jean Paul Sartre in pedagogical robes.
The results? Therapeutic pedagogies have
achieved their goals; and in doing so, they have
become part of the problem they wanted to solve.
The therapeutically raised generation is truly autonomous, at least to the extent that they have
ruled out any commitment that would go beyond the borders of subjective choice and personal
well-being. It is the logical result of programmatic
questioning of objective moral reality. If I am being convinced that the final arbiter of moral values is me or my feelings, eventually I will believe
it. If I am methodically urged to self-identify my
existence through free choice, I will eventually do
it. Who would have expected that, entirely freely,
I would choose evil? But it could have been expected—at least since Zimbardo and Milgram.46
But before them, Dostoyevsky already said it; and
before him, Aquinas, Augustine, Paul of Tarsus,
and many others.
In Place of Conclusion: The Abolition of Man
Many of the problems of the therapeutic approach were uniquely dealt with by C. S.
Lewis in his book The Abolition of Man, subtitled Reflections on education with special reference to the teaching of English in the upper forms
of schools. Lewis’s treatise crosses lines not only
in its form—concise, intense, brief, and all with
typical Lewis readability—but most of all in that
Lewis almost prophetically predicted the moral
problems that came later. Most observers or critics—including those I refer to here—normally
analyze the results of some phenomenon, but
Lewis, with unprecedented foresight, presented a
description of what was yet to come. Therefore,
he deserves special attention in the conclusion of
this paper.
The text of the book is based on three lectures Lewis gave in 1943.47 Lewis is reacting to
a textbook on the English language which—so
it wouldn’t offend anyone—was hidden under
10
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the designation “green book” by the pseudonymous authors “Gaius and Titus.” It was a book
written in 1939 called The Control of Language: A
Critical Approach to Reading and Writing, by Alex
King and Martin Ketley. Lewis analyzes the way
in which the authors of the textbook subvert the
students’ values—not only the moral ones. When
a value statement is made, such as “that waterfall
is beautiful,” the authors teach that it is only the
subjective statement of a specific feeling on the
part of the observer, not a statement about objective reality. We think we’re saying something important about something real, but we are actually
only saying something about our own feelings,
claim the authors. Lewis argues that such subjectivism in value judgments is flawed because
some subjects and some acts are actually real;
that is, they are objective and deserve an evaluation, whether positive or negative. A waterfall is
objectively beautiful, a villain is objectively evil.
Understandably, an ethics which doesn’t believe
in the reality of objective moral values will avoid
the concepts of good and evil. But if we replace
“good” with predicates like “necessary,” “progressive,” or “impressive,” we are using just a trick of
language, a linguistic ruse, says Lewis, who explains with the questions “necessary for what?
progressing towards what? effecting what? In the
last resort they [Gaius and Titus] would have to
admit that some state of affairs was in their opinion good for its own sake.” In other words—it
is good to call things by their right names and
cultivate an “ethics without predicates.”
According to Lewis, this ethics has been well
taught by good teachers from time immemorial.
Lewis reminds us of the thinkers of antiquity
such as Plato, Aristotle and Augustine, who, in
one way or another, cultivated “ordinate affections,” that is, teaching people to love that which
ought to be loved and to hate that which ought to
be hated—to love good and hate evil. Although
moral feelings and values are real, they don’t develop automatically in people, says Lewis. Hence
the need for education. Those who don’t have
these moral capacities are lacking the very thing
that would make them specifically human. They
would be, in Lewis’s words, “men without chests”
or “without hearts.” The Gaius and Titus book

to affect our very language.” 48 Man’s conquest
produces such people by undermining the fact
that people are capable of contact with objecof Nature turns out to be Nature’s conquest of
tive reality (moral, aesthetic or other) and thus
Man. Man’s power over everything destroys him.
taking away from them that which is humanely
Lewis called the process of conquering, when
the most valuable. (If such people were asked,
people sacrifice one thing after another, and fi“Do you think there is something real outside
nally even themselves, in order to gain power
of you—truth, goodness, beauty, the noumena?”
over nature and human nature, a “magician’s
they would answer, “No—there’s only you, the
bargain.” Faust’s metaphor illustrates the fact
subject, your impression,
that modern “science” has
phenomena, illusion.”)
the same goal as the anPedocentrism of this type
What will happen with
cient magic, which is the
the human world when we
submission of reality to the
necessarily leads to moral
explain away and thus dowishes of humankind—to
sujectivism and relativism, as is
mesticate moral reality? In
command the wind and
well illustrated by the handbook the rain, to gain that hidthe last part of his book,
of one of the therapeutic
Lewis gives an unbelieveous strength,49 which is in
education programs with the
ably accurate sketch of the
fact to become a god. To
contours of the modern
achieve their goal, they use
title Growing up Caring.
dystopia that should soon
magic and science to do
emerge if this demoralizing trend were tp conthings that have long been considered “disgusttinue. The power of human beings to do exactly
ing and impious.”
what they wish will grow with the so-called “conThe same applies to moral values and princiquest of nature,” that is, the development of the
ples. If they are conquered, people will have the
natural sciences. However, every new power acpower to freely modify, design, and even produce
quired by Man is, at the same time, “power over
them. Moral values and ethics are not things
man,” says Lewis. Therefore, it is good to ask
that determine a person, but things that persons
whose power grows with every further sublimathemselves determine however they see fit, a sitution of nature. Lewis predicts that if the dream of
ation that means the end of them. And this is the
some scientists becomes a reality and we humans
“tragi-comedy of our situation,” Lewis concludes:
“take control of nature,” it will mean the supremwe call loudly for precisely those qualities that we
acy of hundreds of people over billions of others.
ourselves have subverted: “In a sort of ghastly simThe final stage of conquest will be conquest of
plicity we remove the organ and demand the funcone’s self, that is, human nature. Human nature
tion. We make men without chests and expect of
will be the final bastion of the natural world that
them virtue and enterprise. We laugh at honor and
will be conquered. The victorious ruling minorare shocked to find traitors in our midst. We casity will become a caste of Conditioners, that
trate and bid the geldings be fruitful.”50
is, people who will have control tools (he mentions eugenetics, genetics and psychology) and
Disclosure statement
who will knead, form, and cut out the nature of
No potential conflict of interest was reported
the succeeding generations however they want:
by the author.
“The process which, if not checked, will abolish Man goes on apace among Communists and
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The Common Thread in
Kuyper, Kuhn and Cognitive
Psychology: Interpretive
Frameworks

by Daniel Hitchcock
“We see and understand things not as they
are but as we are.” ~Anthony de Mello—
Awareness (1990)

Christian mystic Anthony de Mello illustrates
today’s postmodern view of reality. He seems to
say that truth and reality are autonomous, subjective constructions in the eye of the beholder.
Thus, Truth claims cannot be judged as true in
all contexts for all times but are relative to some
frame of reference like personal perception, lanDr. Daniel F. A. Hitchcock is Associate Professor of
Psychology at the College of Arts and Sciences at Regent
University, Virginia Beach, Virginia.
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guage, or culture.
The idea that subjectivity influences the way
we interpret the world is not new; neither is the
idea that subjective factors influence the methods, discoveries, and applications of human collective efforts. Over the last half-century, the
bastion of objective reason has been crumbling at
its Enlightenment foundation. Fatal blows have
come from insights in psychology and the philosophy of science. Although modern positivistic science has been mortally wounded, I believe
an integrative approach can be taken between a
strong relativistic position on truth and an absolutist one. The Christian faith as a worldview legitimizes the assertion that there is a “real world”
as well as the belief that we perceive it through
interpretive lenses, which I will be calling “interpretive frameworks.” These frameworks can yield
a plurality of views, including imperfect ones.
The goal of this paper is to explore the conflict between the relativistic and absolutist positions on truth, using insights from cognitive psychology, philosophy of science, and Christianity.
First, I will highlight how subjectivity takes
place at the level of the individual, as described
by schema theory. Second, I will show that the
same cognitive process lies at the heart of human
social efforts via shared interpretive frameworks
often called “paradigms.” And third, I will address the glaring implication of such subjectiv-

plain a variety of phenomena—especially in
ity. If individuals and groups interpret the world
memory research and cognitive development. The
via their own subjective frameworks, the result is
result has been a theory explaining that subjective
relativism, which is antithetical to objective abinterpretive frameworks are used to see and undersolute truth that stands firm across all times and
stand the world. Today we call this theory “schecontexts. I will argue that Christian worldview
ma theory,” the name originating from Kant.3
philosophy helps resolve the apparent conflict
based upon the biblical insight that the way we
Over the last century, key European psycholosee and understand realgists, including Frederick
ity stems ultimately from
Bartlett and Jean Piaget,
Although modern positivistic
the condition of our heart.
have articulated and apInterpretive frameworks
plied this idea. Bartlett conscience has been mortally
are fundamental to human
cluded that memory is a rewounded, I believe an
nature, and embracing
construction of interaction
integrative approach can
their role in human funcwith the environment that
be taken between a strong
tioning poses no threat to
involves pre-set schemata
relativistic position on truth
a biblical view of truth and
or frameworks that guide
reality.
both memory storage and
and an absolutist one.
recall.4 Piaget took the idea
Individual Subjectivity:
of interpretive frameworks
Cognitive Schema Theory
beyond memory processing and articulated an enAt the heart of schema theory is the relative
tire theory of cognitive development based upon
nature of human sensory perception. The claim
their role in organizing all experience.5
that the process of perception is not an exact
When the “cognitive revolution” took place
match of the original sensation from the external
in American psychology in the late 1960s,6 the
world originates with Immanuel Kant.1 This idea
mantle was taken up by many, including Ulrich
Neisser, who speculated that mental cognitive
was given experimental support in the late 1800s
schemata result from actual physical processes in
by the founder of psychology, Wilhelm Wundt,
the nervous system.7
who researched psychophysics in Germany.2 For
example, I use this demonstration to illustrate
Schema theory has even been explanatory in
how perception is relative. I place two buckets of
the research areas of artificial intelligence, neural
water in front of the class, one with ice. I ask a
network theory, and neuroscience, by theorists
volunteer willing to get his or her hand wet, to
including Michael Arbib.8 Arbib believes that
rate, on a scale of 1 to 10, the temperature of the
schema theory is the best explanation for going
bucket without ice. This contains cold tap water,
beyond the structure of the brain to an underand the student usually rates it as a 3 or 4. Next,
standing of the function of it.9
I have the student rate the ice water—using the
In recent decades, many researchers have consame hand—which usually receives an emphatic
firmed that schemata serve as frameworks that
rating of 1! I then instruct the student to quickly
guide interpretation. This confirmation has been
put his or her hand back into first bucket and rate
shown in domains such as story recall,10 text comthe water anew. The student surprisingly says, “It
prehension, and speed of recall,11 linguistics,12
feels like a 6 or 7.” This response reveals that pervisual learning,13 cultural differences in cogniception is relative and is more dependent upon
tion,14 computational cognition,15 and problem
the current skin temperature than upon the temsolving16 and has been applied widely in various
perature of the stimulus. The point is that, at an
disciplines, including education.17
individual level, we are bound by an interpretaThe work by Wundt, Bartlett, Piaget, Neisser
tion process that is relative to individual experiand Arbib shows how our cognition is an inherence.
ently subjective process. It is the interplay of an
Over the years this idea has been used to exindividual’s sensation and perception and the rePro Rege—March 2018
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ality of his or her environment. However, the role
of interpretive frameworks does not end here at
the individual level, but it extends to how meaning is shared and understood collectively. The
same cognitive process lies at the core of human
social efforts. Shared interpretive frameworks
function in ways that yield collective subjectivity.
Collective Subjectivity
Humans are social creatures, dependent upon
the structures of family, society, and culture.
Given this social dependency, it makes sense that
the use of interpretive frameworks would have a
social counterpart seen in groups.
The idea was anticipated first in the 1930s by
Lev Vygotsky’s sociocultural view of cognition.
Vygotsky claimed inter-dependence between
individual cognition and the social context in
which it takes place.18 This view, that a type of
collective interpretive framework guides group or
social functioning, has been articulated in disciplines beyond the social sciences, most notably in
the history and philosophy of science.
Over the last half-century, much investigation has looked at the social structure of science.
The findings have underscored the role of subjectivity in scientific activity, in contrast to the
modernist mindset, which sees science as a purely
objective endeavor. The overarching consensus of
this work has been that groups of scientists function under a type of conceptual structure that
orients their work. This structure is subject to
non-science-related influences, such as aesthetics,
persuasion, and personalities. Although there is
controversy as to who should get credit for the
originality of some of his concepts,19 none can
deny that Thomas Kuhn’s book The Structure of
Scientific Revolutions20 has been one of the most
important works published on the topic in the
last half-century.21
Human Science Guided by Paradigms
Kuhn articulated a new way for understanding scientific progress. He argued that a linear
progression of discovery upon discovery—accumulating objective knowledge—was insufficient for describing how science actually works.
He proposed a model describing science as un16
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predictable and irregular. Rather than a vertical,
linear process, he suggested more of a horizontal
one of skips and jumps within a single plane, motivated not by anything objective but by subjective, socially-driven factors, such as personality,
prestige, and aesthetics. He even used the religious term of “faith” and the metaphor of “conversion” to describe how an individual scientist
jumps allegiance from one view to another.
Kuhn’s basic concept for describing science
centers on the notion of a paradigm. A paradigm is a collective conceptual framework that
includes a complicated mixture of assumptions,
theories, and hypotheses accepted by the group
that establish a type of unconscious perimeter
within which scientific investigation takes place.
Progress is better seen as growth in depth rather
than growth in breadth. Science is like digging
a well straight down within a defined perimeter.
Although not always known by those working in it, the perimeter of the paradigm is limited. Nature, however, is not so limited; therefore,
some discoveries do not fit within the boundaries of the tight-knit paradigm. Someone digging
near the edge may accidentally dig beyond the
boundary. Kuhn calls such findings “anomalies.”
They are often ignored and swept under the rug
by those who discover them—unless they recur
enough to create a crisis within the paradigm: a
state of tension for anomalies that can no longer
be ignored. When the paradigm can no longer
provide a comprehensive explanatory framework,
that paradigm must give way to another paradigm in order to accommodate the new data.
This giving way shifts the discipline to a completely different and seemingly incompatible
paradigm. Kuhn calls this change a “paradigm
shift,” or a “revolution”—a process of demolition
and reconstruction—in contrast to the traditional modernist view of gradual, vertical, linear, and
harmonious progress.
Kuhn points to a gestalt switch (like a 3D
Necker cube drawing) as an analogy to describe
this process, where a single set of data can be
perceived in two completely different ways—but
only one way at a time. Kuhn’s description underscores the idea that humans are subjective in
their collective interpretation of even scientific

world.
Looking closely, however, we find that neither view negates reality itself. Rather than seeing these conflicting paradigms as supporting the
Frameworks Do Not Yield Relativism
idea that reality is only in the eye of the beholder,
So far, we have seen two similar descriptions
we should conclude that the interpretation of reof how humans understand and experience the
ality is what is in the eye of the beholder. This latworld, both individually and collectively—via
ter statement more clearly highlights the role of
individual and shared interpretive frameworks:
our imperfect perception and cognition as they
cognitive structures of belief and expectations
interact with the real world, rather than claiming
that guide the interpretation of reality. Each dethat reality itself is malleable.
scription highlights subjectivity in contrast to the
Our view should be
objectivity of traditional
that a real world exists,
modernism.
Correctly understood,
and that experiences, based
The subjective and noninterpretive frameworks, such
firmly in that real world,
cumulative process disas schemata and paradigms,
can nonetheless be intercussed by Kuhn, and also
are each quite compatible with
preted and understood difby others such as Polanyi22
objective, absolute reality.
ferently, given the particuin the 1960s, took direct
lar framework (i.e., schema
aim at modernism’s objecor paradigm). John Searle articulates a similar
tive impartiality and began, in part, to usher in
view. He presents a satisfying alternative to the
post modernity. The knee-jerk reaction by many
old modernist view as well as to the prevailing
in science, as well as in Christianity, has been to
postmodern constructionist and deconstructionresist the sea change to postmodernism. Some
ist views, which both deny any ultimate realhave critiqued this change as relativism and antiity.24 Searle suggests that two types of facts exscience.23 Christians have resisted such new ideas
too because of the danger of runaway relativism.
ist: “brute” facts, which are independent of what
Such a view seems to undermine the Christian
humans think about them (such as that Mount
conviction of absolute truth’s flowing from an
Everest has snow), and “social” facts, which are
almighty sovereign God, who is objectively real.
humanly constructed and conceived individually
Granted, the views presented allow for relaor institutionally (such as a piece of paper is a $5
tive interpretation by individuals and groups,
bill). This position affirms that which cognitive
but I believe that neither should be classified as
schema theory and philosophers of science, like
endorsing postmodern relativism, which denies
Kuhn, contend: that a true reality exists and that
the existence of absolute truth. Correctly underhumans develop interpretive frameworks with
stood, interpretive frameworks, such as schemata
which they interpret that reality.
and paradigms, are each quite compatible with
objective, absolute reality.
Illusory Schema Conflict:
When relativity is an illusion
Schemata: Basis For Relativity?
One important point to highlight is that
Taking the ideas from cognitive psychology
sometimes what looks like relativism is only an
or philosophy of science to an extreme, we find
illusion. Regarding the function of schemata as
that it does look like postmodern relativism. Yes,
they guide individual understanding, I see two
human perceptual systems “construct” an underaspects of the process that can yield what I term
standing of the world that does not always match
“illusory schema conflict.” The first deals with
reality. Yes, humans mentally construct schemata
multiple exemplars of a single concept, while the
that guide perception. Yes, collective thinking or
other draws attention to the possibility of mulparadigms seem to be exclusively mind-depentiple interpretations of a single exemplar.
dent and subjective—apart from the objective
Let me illustrate the first with the tallest
facts, guided by a collective interpretive framework.
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mountain question. If I asked, “What is the tallest mountain on Earth?” most would say Mount
Everest in Nepal and China—it stands over
29,000 feet above sea level. However, is Mount
Everest really the tallest mountain on Earth? If
we invoke different schemata to define the concept of “tallest mountain,” there can be a plurality of correct answers:
• Tallest from its base below sea level (under water): Mauna Kea in Hawaii, 33,480
feet.
• Tallest rising from ocean floor: Mount
Lamlam, Guam, 37,820 feet from the
Mariana Trench
• Tallest from center of the earth: Mount
Chimborazo in Ecuador, over 20 million
feet.
The use of different schemata underscores
the role of definition and context. Interpersonal
misunderstandings are often caused by this type
of schema conflict. Two different interpretive
frameworks are correctly used, but they come
to disparate conclusions. These differences show
that sometimes differences may be due not to
whether someone is wrong or right but simply to
the fact that more than one point of view is viable.
The second type of schema conflict occurs
when differing schemata are derived honestly
from a single exemplar. An illustration of this is
the ancient parable from India about six blind
men walking who encounter an obstacle in their
path. As each reaches out to touch what is in his
way, the six have an awful argument because
none can agree on what it is. One says it’s a spear,
another says it is a hose, while yet another claims
it is a fan. The fourth declares it is a wall, but
another claims it is a pillar, and the last is convinced it is a rope with a brush on its end. What
they have encountered? The moral derived is that
there are many ways to describe an elephant and
that individual perception is limited. Some argue
that this parable illustrates relativity—that each
man experienced his own truth, valid for him
and not the others. However, I suggest a more
cryptic meaning. Yes, each man’s framework was
different from that of the others, but the six views
actually come together to form a more complete
18
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whole.
This way of looking at the story highlights
a distinction between the two types of schema
conflict. The first, illustrated by the mountain
story, affirms the multiplicity of truth, mediated
by context, while the elephant story shows that a
grand truth may lie behind multiple interpretations. This latter example emphasizes how seemingly differing views may actually come together
to provide a more complete understanding. The
apostle Paul makes a similar point in Romans
and I Corinthians when he explains that although there are many separate parts of the body,
they function together as a whole.25 This principle applies not only to the physical body and the
Church of Jesus Christ but also to human cognitive function.
In both cases of illusory schema conflict, the
conflict seems to reveal incompatible ways of understanding when, in actuality, the conflicting
schemata or views can be shown to be simultaneously totally true.
This raises the question of whether we, individually or collectively, are capable of seeing beyond our own interpretive frameworks to perceive
the whole. No doubt, this perception of the whole
might be possible, but probably not in all circumstances because we have been created with limits: normative limits imposed simply by the fact
that we are created creatures and by the intrusion
and distortion of sin.26 Both types of limitations
probably play a role in obstructing our view of the
whole. I speculate that some portions of our limited view, specifically those due to the distortion
of sin, are potentially fixable, or at least partially,
via sanctification; but post-consummation, some
of these limits will be entirely gone, and we will
experience knowledge of the true-for-all-time,
uber-framework.
An Uber-framework?
An uber-framework is the idea that there exists an overarching metanarrative that gives ultimate meaning to varying and sometimes seemingly disparate cultural and/or individual narratives. Several Christian scholars have argued
for the existence of such a superior framework.27
For example, Roy Clouser makes a case for an

edge and Truth and that the Bible is a direct filter
overarching framework that subsumes both pure
for Truth. Kuyper believed that people can and
Aristotelian objectivity and Kantian subjectivity
should understand Christianity as a holistic and
and provides a third alternative: that ultimate
comprehensive philosophy of life rather than as
knowledge lies with God alone. Clouser suggests
just one compartmental aspect of human experithat there exists an overarching uber-framework,
ence.31, 32
albeit in the mind of God alone, that subsumes
28
all others.
This is where Kuyper highlights worldview as a type of interpretive framework. The
This idea has been articulated by many in the
term itself is translated from the German word
context of worldview philosophy, particularly by
Weltanschauung, which means “a particular way
Christians who believe that in God lies ultimate
of looking at the world.” The term originates
truth, or the true worldview of worldviews—the
with Kant, as we saw with
uber-framework. In my
the term schema.33 Since his
judgment, the concept
An uber-framework is the idea
paradigm that we have
that there exists an overarching time, it has come to mean
described thus far in the
a set of underlying assumpmetanarrative that gives
context of the philosophy
tions that define the spirit
ultimate meaning to varying
of science is identical in
of the age or the particular
and sometimes seemingly
essence and function with
way a culture manifests itthe concept of worldview
self in literature, art, philosdisparate cultural and/or
that has been articulated
ophy, and science. Kuyper
individual narratives.
by many Christian phiused the term to suggest
losophers.
that multiple worldviews
can co-exist and be in conflict with one another
Christian Worldview Philosophy
while competing for people’s allegiance.
In David Naugle’s in-depth look at the conIn his day, Kuyper identified two opposcept of worldview, he traces the idea of an overing “faiths,” or worldviews, that were in direct
arching worldview that explains all reality—back
conflict: modernism versus Christianity. Kuyper
to the Reformation writings of John Calvin and
suggested that the conflict resulted ultimately
then, in the late 1800s, to Scottish theologian
from Adam and Eve’s fall in to sin. The Fall proJames Orr and Dutch theologian Abraham
duced an antithesis, or tension between God and
Kuyper.29 As the more well-known of these two,
idolatry (or evil), that is manifested in all human
endeavors. Relating this antithesis to science, for
Kuyper’s version will be described briefly.
example, Naugle states,
Kuyperian Worldview Philosophy
Kuyper argues [that]… regenerate people
Kuyper is known for applying Calvinism to
with a Christian worldview produce a … theeveryday life, focusing on the sovereignty of the
istic interpretation of science, and non-regenGod of the Bible over all aspects of reality: coserate people with a non-Christian worldview
mos, culture and thought. Calvin believed that
produce an idolatrous science …. Scientific
God revealed Himself to humans via the created
reason is not the same for all people. It deorder, as well as through the Bible, the infallible
pends upon whether or not the scientist has
and inerrant words written under the influence of
or has not been religiously renewed. There
the Holy Spirit. Of these two revelations, Calvin
is not a neutral scientific rationality leading
gave priority to the Bible when he used the metato certain objective and shared conclusions.
Instead, scientific theories are a function of
phor of the Scriptures being spectacles through
the religious backgrounds and philosophical
which humans are to interpret and understand
30
orientations of the scientists or theorists.34
the rest of God’s creation. In other words,
Calvin claimed that God, as sovereign creator
It is important to point out that the conflict
of all things, is the ultimate source of all knowlis not in the science itself but in the conclusions
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made (i.e., interpretation and application).
Kuyper is basically arguing that collective
interpretive frameworks function in society.
His argument is similar to our earlier description of collective cognition as seemingly relative.
But Kuyper’s Christian worldview philosophy is
clearly based on a belief that there is a real creator,
God, who is objectively manifest in the material
creation as well as in the Bible. Both realms are
objectively true. But seeming relativity comes
into Kuyper’s thought when he claims that there
are different interpretations of that reality: “abnormal” and “normal,” as he termed them.35
Those who are regenerated by the power of God’s
Holy Spirit are given a new outlook, which allows them to understand that the cosmos is in
an abnormal state due to sin and in need of redemption through Jesus Christ, but those who
are unregenerate see all as normal and see the
need for Christ as folly. The result is a difference
in interpretation of a single reality, not a difference between two constructed realities that are
mutually exclusive.
One implication from Christian Worldview
philosophy is that God’s reality is the uber-framework—the true paradigm or schemata, the only
correct interpretation—and that human access
to the framework is only possible by regeneration of the Holy Spirit. The reverse implication is
that without God’s action, flawed frameworks or
wrong schemata, paradigms, or worldviews exist,
leading to framework errors at all levels.
Another implication is that because the Holy
Spirit’s regeneration focuses inwardly, we may
need to consider that our interpretive frameworks
are more than cognitive. Recently, some have begun to critique36 the idea of worldview as a static,
theoretical, and cognitive process and to direct
us to see our interpretive frameworks as coming
from the heart—which encompasses our identity
more holistically.37 For example, Jamie Smith
suggests that when talking about worldview, we
need to move to a more non-cognitive, affective
model, which includes our cares, concerns, motivations, and desires.38 Based upon insight from
Esther Meek,39 Naugle argues that “the heart
needs to be rooted in the physical body…and anchored in the ebb and flow of the real world,”40
20
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meaning that knowing with the heart, which is
the center of human consciousness, involves the
totality of our being. This is where our individual
cognitive schemata intermingle with our collective paradigms and worldviews and guide us in
holistic biological, psychological, and social consciousness.
Conclusion
The interpretive frameworks we have looked
at (cognitive schemata, paradigms, and worldviews) seem to all function in a common way—
as filters to help us understand the world around
us. This way of human perception seems to be by
design. God created us to gain individual and social knowledge through interpretive frameworks.
These frameworks provide a starting point as well
as an important heuristic for our exploration and
progress in fulfilling the cultural mandate.41
One aspect of this design is clear: there are
limitations. We are limited perceivers but will
someday be freed from at least part of the limitation. Human nature is restricted in that we are
creatures created by God and, as such, will never
apprehend fully the true uber-worldview, which
is known by God alone. We all are affected by the
distortion of sin, which implies that some of the
subjectivity of our cognitive perceptions is due to
sin. This distortion explains why errors happen at
all levels of our interpretive frameworks.
The Christian’s hope is that Christ’s redemptive work of restoration will yield for us a more
complete way of knowing at His second coming.
As the apostle Paul said, “Now I know in part;
then I shall know fully.” We have confidence that
part of the limitation in our ability to know will
be removed.
Perhaps without sin’s effect upon our interpretive frameworks, we may share a common
perceptual organization, language, culture, paradigm, and worldview. Having a shared interpretive framework seems consistent with the biblical theme of restoration. Recall that the origin
of multiple languages and culture groups came
from God’s judgment of sin at the Tower of
Babel. Perhaps God will bring “heart” and “cognitive” unity to all the diverse nations who occupy the new Jerusalem by establishing a common

set of interpretive frameworks for all its citizens.
The biblical narrative of creation, fall, redemption, and consummation is the human entrance
into God’s true worldview, the uber-framework,
where God’s people will know more fully, which
may mean to know in the same way from percept
to thought to culture. When that day arrives, we
all, including Anthony de Mello, will no longer
see and understand things as we were, but will
see and understand them as God intended, as
they truly are.
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WANTED: Vegetarian
Kuyperians with Artistic
Underwear

by Calvin Seerveld
Craig Bartholomew’s IVP Academic publication, Contours of the Kuyperian Tradition (2017),
is indeed a magisterial systematic introduction
to the cloud of witnesses (and many fellow travelers) who have articulated a basically biblical,
Jean Calvinian, committed world-and-life vision on how to live before God’s face until Jesus
Christ comes again to complete historically the
Kingdom-Rule of God (Psalm 110, Acts 1:3,
Hebrews 10:19-12:29) in this world, which belongs to the holy Triune Sovereign Creator God
revealed in the Scriptures.
Dr. Calvin Seerveld is husband to Ines Naudin ten Cate;
their three children are Dordt graduates. He is Senior
Member emeritus in Philosophical Aesthetics at the
Graduate Institute for Christian Studies in Toronto.
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A difficulty of passing on such a
Reformational-perspective pair of glasses from
one older generation to the next younger generation is that its visionary contour is less defined
than a philosophical one, and it is also often subverted by the primal Way-of-life which always
underlies us humans, who consciously have (or
do not have) a “Weltanschauung.”1 To “retrieve
and renew” a life-guiding (Kuyperian) tradition
is not like excavating certain ideas as if they be
stones and then rebuilding anew the old ruined
house we once lived in, especially if Edward Shils
is correct in saying, “A tradition once it has receded from regular usage cannot be deliberately
restored.”2 The usual resulting “Neo-” character
of such a maneuver tends, in my judgment, to be
artificial, at best a beautiful bouquet of cut flowers.
What would it take, God willing, to foster a
vital Kuyperian tradition in the consciousness of
the coming generation that is not handicapped by
being “Neo-Kuyperian”? I will offer two suggestions for our discussion: (1) A Kuyperian worldand-life vision has a supple, not analytically defined but imaginative, literarily composed character; and (2) our program should be to discover
anew, reformingly embody, and freely share the
Kuyperian-spirited constellation of insights with
our neighbors, focused on their actual needs.
My own practice is to talk about a “committed world-and-life vision” instead of the truncated Weltanschauung, worldview.3 Talk about

sinner” [Luke 18:9-14]).
“worldview” omits the element of life praxis—
Now, if a committed world-and-life visionary
which Kuyper’s original Dutch phrase “levenstradition—Nietzschean, American Dream, or
en-wereld beschouwing” highlighted! The odd
Christian Kuyperian—“is the structured transterm of “life-system,” which Kuyper used in the
action of passing on wonts from practiced to in1898 Stone lectures, shows the importance of
experienced human hands,”8 we have a sure guide
“life” to him; but “system,” I think, overstates
the kind of cohering form belonging to a synopto the enormous challenge we face, because “the
tic vision.4 I use “vision” partly because of Ezra
wonts” of the Kuyperian tradition are as varied as
creaturely life.
Pound’s wise dictum, “Don’t be viewy,”5 vague,
We will need the daily practice of attent,
muddled, obscure, “worldviewish.”
connecting Bible readHowever, I do believe it
ing at family meals; a
is proper for a committed
How
about
proposing
that
regular healthy diet of
world-and-life vision tradiartistry should be the underwear,
body-building grains and
tion not to be theoretically
at least of the well-dressed
greens, without a constant
conceptually exact. The
intelligible contour preKuyperian readied for service in gratuitous sugar caress; an
expectant Sunday worship
sented by S.G. de Graaf’s
God’s world.
service with a church year
Ve r b o n d s g e s c h i e d e n i s
of solid Scriptural preach(1936)6 has an unmistaking, earnest liturgical confession of sin to be
able redemptive-historical visionary Gestalt that
forgiven, and joyful, communion-building celis richly biblical, but strict theological jargon I
ebration of the eucharist. We need to be learnfind absent. Thomas Cole’s painterly series of four
ing a trade that fits our gifts and enjoy a week
large canvases narrating our human Voyage of
of work that somehow serves good to somebody
Life (1842)7 convincingly articulates the Horatio
and helps pay our bills; a habit of wide reading
Alger American Dream world-and-life vision of
in cultural history and current affairs with wise
greatness that is Neo-Idealistically attractive and
mentors nearby; a circle of friends with the cushollow as hell. Bertolt Brecht’s oeuvre depicts
tom to play games together uncontaminated by
and champions a pragmatistic survival ethic that
a competitive mania, where there rises time for
promises an everlasting bitter-sweet meaning in a
intimate conversation—it takes an encyclopedic
kind of inverted Nietzschean tradition.
range and ensemble of exercised human activiThat is, it helps me to understand the bulky
ties to show-and-tell, to engender and spread a
nature and power of the Kuyperian tradition if
committed world-and-life vision with a special
I realize that the cosmic scope but non-philo(Nietzschean, American Dream or) Kuyperian
sophical rigor to its perspective has the nature of
cachet, beyond telling about it. To chant “square
literate precision. Literary precision is not analytiinch” and “sphere sovereignty” will not keep alive
cally tight, but the right word like “woebegone”
the blessing of a reforming Kuyperian tradition,
or “bluster” can call up a florescent peacock tail
since its concatenated wonts are not reducible to
of nuances that nevertheless can catch precisely a
a few pregnant ideas.9
rich reality at hand. When Shakespeare’s Lady
Macbeth utters “Out, damned spot! Out, I say!”
Would teaching and learning the Refor(Macbeth, V.1), she is not everyday swearing and
mational Christian philosophical systematics—
is also not just carefully confessing “I committed
of Vollenhoven, Dooyeweerd, Zuidema, Mekkes,
intentional first degree murder.” But the theatriK.J. Popma, H. van Rieseen, H. Evan Runner,
cal saying has a bloody, down-to-earth, cry-toRobert Knudsen, Peter Steen, Sander Griffioen,
heaven, spirited specificity that is not scientifically
Edward Schuurman and others, which was and is
precise but is aesthetically lucid, engaging, overa like-spirited conceptual deepening of this very
whelming (as in Jesus’ parables, with the crooked
Kuyperian committed world-and-life vision—
tax collector praying, “God, be merciful to me, a
help the living propagation of the Kuyperian
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tradition? In my own judgment and experience,
when a theoretical physicist (Harry van der
Laan)10 or a political science academic (Bernard
Zylstra)11 has digested the jargon-invested, basic
intricacies of the Reformational Christian philosophy, which has embedded in its categorical
framework and gut a cross-disciplinary avenue for
communal reflection, then surprising alternative
scholarship with wisdom can result, like economist Bob Goudzwaard’s Beyond the Modern Age,12
and oncologist James Rusthoven’s Covenantal
Biomedical Ethics for Contemporary Medicine.13
Educated thinkers whose special field analysis
and counsel has not been forged with and honed
by Reformational philosophical hypotheses and
who don’t think with a committed Kuyperian
world-and-life vision are too handicapped, I
think, to be integrally Christian in their professional theoretical activity. But superficial knowledge of Reformational Christian philosophy is
not an insurance policy one can cash in for being
able to speak redemptive knowledge as a banker,
CEO, pastor, governing official or teacher.
One last comment: since a committed worldand-life visionary tradition has, to my thinking,
an imaginative literary consistency, not to say a
supervening, suggestion-rich, artistic quality, I’d
like to raise the ante on Kuyper’s well-known
phrase that “art is no fringe that is attached to the
garment” of human life.14 How about proposing
that artistry should be the underwear, at least of
the well-dressed Kuyperian readied for service in
God’s world.
Every mature Kuyperian child of God should
have underneath his or her visible activity clothing, I suggest, a supportive fabric of images (like
Ernst Barlach’s Singing Man, Käthe Kollwitz’s
Mother with dead child, Rembrandt’s late selfportraits), an invigorating psalm-song under the
breath (Genevan 51, 89, 141), a poignant favorite poetic fragment or novel scene remembered
(Shakespeare’s “Love is not love / Which alters
when it alteration finds...”; Gwendolyn Brooks,
“The Old Marrieds”; the severe act of crossing out
Pieter’s name from the Bible by his father Jakob
van Vlaanderen, in Alan Paton’s “Too Late the
Phalarope”); a readiness for gracious, salty speech
(see parable-speaking Jesus; Colossians 4:6)—all
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of which are conducive to instilling and practicing a vital Kuyperian merciful and just Kingdom
of God tradition among us.
Kuyperian Christian schooling would do
well, it seems to me, to make wearing such underwear training a priority, since the arts are
among the best resilient, subtle, and invigorating
carriers of world-and-life visions.15
Could we perhaps tweak the “retrieve and renew” formula to discover and absorb, in order to
give away the Kuyperian tradition as a task for
promoting shalom? That is, a world-and-life vision is not so much a deposit you can pick up and
refurbish, as it is an on-going, blood-coursing,
world-wide, holding-patterned communal consciousness one inhabits or not.
As I understand it, a “Christian world-andlife vision is a thetical orientation and not a judgmental condemnation; [it is] a program for doing
good for the commonweal and not a plan of attack on enemies.”16 So it is a joy to give-it-away to
wandering people who may be at a loss, provided
you do not come on as Proverbs 27:15 puts it,
“like the dribbling drivel of a leaky roof on a day
of pounding rain.”
If you be a person whose inescapable Way-oflife has not yet sprung a self-conscious world-andlife vision, to be introduced to the all-encompassing Kuyperian tradition, as Craig Bartholomew’s
book does it, can be an exhilarating, eye-opening,
and life-integrating experience. If you are holding onto an un-Christian world-and-life visionary tradition, it may take something more like
a risky, complete blood transfusion to effect the
change in life-orientation. If you meet Kuyperian
progeny while breathing a different Christian
world-and-life vision (Anabaptist Mennonite, or
Roman Catholic), you may notice blind spots in
the Kuyperians yet be willing to supplement your
resident perspective with certain Reformational
biblical strengths.
The most difficult encounter happens, I
think, when someone who once had accepted
the Reformed contours but because of some accidental affront or mistaken assumption willfully
decided to reject its vision or let it atrophy. You
cannot argue such disenchanted people into embracing the Kuyperian tradition again; even try-

ing to make them jealous of its healing grace for
distracted people is a tough row to hoe.17
How is the elderly generation to transmit the
Kuyperian tradition live to the up-and-coming
generation and take pains to avoid the “Neo-” atavism which deforms a percolating visionary tradition into a cliché? I learned from colleague Bill
Rowe that the handing on of wonts should take
place face-to-face, seasoned person before novice
and novice before mentor. The written record of
the Kuperian tradition should best become oral,
spoken, with time for response. And I learned
from colleague Peter Steen that a good teacher
necessarily simplifies the matter at hand, but in
such an encouraging way that the student can
complicate what is shown-and-told, so as not to
parrot back what is at stake, but own it one’s self.
You become an aide to a Kuyperian senator
in the legislature; you apprentice yourself as an
aspiring playwright in the Redeemer Roy Louter
writing workshop. I learned the Kuyperian fish
business from watching my Father (who had
never read Kuyper) swiftly fillet flounders so
close to the bone you wasted not a pinch of flesh,
and then tried it hundreds of times over years of
Saturdays and summers.
To transmit well the Kuyperian world-andlife vision takes time—for feedback, corrections,
revised examples, and the random meaningful
asides by the tradition-giver. I learned a major
life-giving (Kuyperian) guideline on being “critical” from Vollenhoven. I was berating Kuyper for
being too taken by Idealist Schelling and NeoClassical Winckelmann’s thought on the practically salvific power of beautiful art.18 “Ja, zeker,”
said Vollenhoven, “maar hij had te veel te doen
(“Yes, sure, but Kuyper had way too much to
do.”), implying that a charismatic leader can’t be
right about everything.
One should not, I believe, overvalue the
Kuyperian Christian tradition because, like
any world-and-life vision, its developed formatting of one’s consciousness that brings to the
fore structural features of our life world (What
is there? How? What’s wrong? Why?) is always
meshed with the matter of directional choice,
or where are we headed? What Spirit drives you
on in your world-and-life vision?19 Unless a win-

some and wise Holy Spirit suffuses and gentles
the Kuyperian tradition, what does it really
profit us and our neighbors? However, if we as
a community live the Kuyperian world-and-life
vision reformanda, constantly tapping into its
wisdom-gospel biblical roots (although it is not
mentioned in Ephesians 6:10-17), the lived, living Kuyperian Christian consciousness can be a
protective hiding place to catch one’s breath in
our mortal struggle as God’s people with the evil
principalities and cultural powers that would destroy us all.
One last comment: let me emphasize that a
committed world-and-life vision is not just simplified lay philosophy, as if the philosophical
meat is just cut up in tiny bite-size bits so that
untrained thinkers can swallow it. No! And as
to the role that literary studies and critical art
history do and could play in lively carrying on
the Kuyperian tradition, Dostoevsky’s Crime
and Punishment novel is as complicated and
intricate as Bakhtin’s philosophical aesthetics,
but Dostoevsky’s all-encompassing vision and
texture is of a nature different from philosophy.
Dostoevsky with imaginative story is priming
a mentality of compassion rather than expositing the fascinating intermeshing of life and reflection. Although using metaphors can be very
dangerous, let me put it this way: philosophers
sense and eat conceptual meat; world-and-life
visionaries are thoughtful perceptual vegetarians who formulate imaginative prose essays.
So, while Reformational philosophers argue
over their hamburger to gain wisdom for bearing
their neighbors’ doubts and burdens, Kuyperians
tell stories, doodle sketches, sing songs, formulate
manifestoes, and start an Institute for Christian
Studies, Redeemer College, Citizens for Public
Justice, Christian Courier, Flagship Gallery...and
remain Kuyperian vegetarians. According to the
prophet Isaiah, as I read him, both Covenantal
Jesus Christ-following diaconal meat-eaters and
vegetarians will feast with “well-aged wines”
together on the new earth (Isaiah 25:6-9). (I
could mention, I have never met an over-weight
Seventh-Day Adventist vegetarian....)
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Editor’s Note: Dr. Chris Gousmett’s letter is a response to Dr. Sacha Walicord’s review of Gary North’s book, Christian
Economics in One Lesson in Pro Rege, vol. 46, no. 1, September 2017.

A Letter to
Dr. Sacha Walicord

by Chris Gousmett
Dear Dr. Walicord,
I often read Pro Rege with interest, as it contains important articles on matters of significance
which are pertinent to our calling to discipleship.
The vision of Kuyper that the whole of human
life is to be brought into subjection to Christ is
Chris Gousmett is currently the Corporate Information
Manager for the Hutt City Council. He studied Hebrew
and Philosophy at the University of Otago, and completed
a Master of Philosophical Foundations degree, focusing
on philosophical theology, at the Institute for Christian
Studies in Toronto. He has a Ph.D. in Patristic theology
from the University of Otago, with a thesis on the interrelationship of philosophical anthropology and the structure of eschatological thought in the Patristic writers. His
interests are in Reformational philosophy and theology, the
history of thought, including history of science, and political and social theory. He has preached in a number of
churches and some of his sermons are available at https://
hearinganddoing.wordpress.com/

one that is frequently voiced with approval. It is
a vision which inspires and motivates many of us
world-wide in our efforts to be faithful in all that
we do.
It was a surprise, then, to read your review
of Gary North’s book, Christian Economics in
One Lesson (http://digitalcollections.dordt.edu/
pro_rege/vol46/iss1/6/). While I do not pretend to
any expertise in economics, I wish to challenge the
approach you have taken in your review because
I believe it is taking a mistaken path, one which
does not do credit to the Lord whom we serve.
While you start with Kuyper’s famous rallying cry, in what follows you espouse an understanding of economics which is radically different from that of many of Kuyper’s spiritual
followers. You seem to hold that both Kuyper’s
followers, and Kuyper himself, are inconsistent
in applying biblical principles to economic life,
given that you state that biblically consistent
publications in economics and politics are a “rarity in our day and age.” This does not ring true for
those of us who are familiar with, for instance,
the works of Bob Goudzwaard, Jim Skillen and
Alan Storkey. Their vision for economics and for
politics is pervasively informed by the Scriptures,
while being academically thorough in their analysis and proposals for reform. You do not refer to
these authors and their work, while asserting that
economics is under-served in the application of
biblical teaching to that subject. There are others who have also worked on developing a biblically faithful approach to economics within the
Kuyperian tradition: to name but a few, Tony
Cramp, George Monsma and John Tiemstra.
Many of these draw on the work of Christian
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economists working in the Kuyperian tradition
in earlier generations, such as T. P. van der Kooy.
While these authors (and others also working
in the same Kuyperian spirit) may not be well
known, and are certainly not as numerous or as
influential as we may like, it would be doing a disservice to them and their potential readers (who
otherwise may not be spurred to seek them out)
to describe biblical works in economics as a “rarity.” There have also been a significant number of
authors writing on politics in a biblically faithful
approach, such as Bernie Zylstra, Paul Marshall,
Jonathan Chaplin, Sander Griffioen, David
Koyzis, Romel Bagares, Rockne McCarthy and
Richard Mouw, and again those of earlier generations: Jan Dengerink, Herman Dooyeweerd,
Antheunis Janse, and others.
Would it then be correct to assume that you
place these thinkers in the category of the “biblically inconsistent” or who only pay “lip service”
to God’s Word, or are part of the “sometimes
biblically inconsistent, ivory-tower transformationalist crowd”? Is that why you do not mention their work even in passing, hurrying on to
laud the works of Gary North, whose views are
inescapably incompatible with those of the writers mentioned above?
You mention that Kuyper’s inconsistencies led to the democratic-welfare state in the
Netherlands. Whether the modern Dutch welfare
state can be attributed to (or blamed on) Kuyper
is probably debatable, but clearly you see a connection between the beliefs he espoused and the
eventual emergence of the welfare state. Leaving
aside the historical validity of this connection
for others to explore, it is true that Kuyper had
significant concern for the welfare of the poorer
folk of his day, as can be seen from his stirring
address at the First Christian Social Congress in
The Netherlands in 1891 (The Problem of Poverty,
translated by Jim Skillen). The politics and economics of Kuyper cannot easily be slotted into
“socialist” or “capitalist” or other categories, since
he made strenuous efforts (however unsuccessfully at times) to be biblical in his approach. He
must be given credit for his achievement in pursuing that goal and for his influence in this regard such that nearly 100 years after his death his
30
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work is still being studied for guidance in how to
live faithfully before the Lord in every area of life.
Many of us who read Goudzwaard, Skillen,
and Storkey with appreciation also have some acquaintance with at least the basic approach, if not
the details, of the views of Gary North and others in that line of thought. It is not an approach
which appeals to us, not because we are closet
Marxists or humanistic in our thinking but because we read the Bible in a different way from
North. Those in the Kuyperian tradition have
clearly demarcated their views from the Marxists
and other humanist thinkers. Indeed, Antheunis
Janse frequently emphasised that the common
error of Marxists, Socialists, Capitalists and others is that the economic side of life was elevated
to a position of dominance over everything else,
supplanting the Lord of Glory, who alone rules
over all of life. This criticism would apply to the
Austrian school of economics of Hayek and von
Mises, who, it appears, have influenced Gary
North more than other thinkers.
Those who differ from North you describe
a number of times as “biblically inconsistent”
while North is described several times as “biblically consistent” or “consistently biblical.” You do
not state anywhere what “biblically consistent”
means, but it seemingly does not apply, in your
view, to those who hold views which differ from
those espoused by North. Perhaps you could enlighten us as to what you consider “consistency”
with Scripture means and why you seem to privilege this term over others such as “faithful to
Scripture.” Surely consistency means more than
following the principles of a tight logical system,
which appears to originate more from humanist economic and political theories than from
Scripture. One of the criticisms of the approach
taken by North and those who follow him has
been the way in which Scripture is interpreted in
a rigid and fundamentalistic manner, which pays
scant attention to context (textual, historical,
social, political, etc.) that urges the application
of OT law immediately to our contemporary
situation. North’s approach is not the only one
which claims to bring the insights of the whole of
Scripture to bear on contemporary life in a way
which is faithful to the one True King. It would

task of government, and what principles and polseem to me that North is significantly less sucicies would be best to enable free and prosperous
cessful in this task than many others, including
human life, without the distortions of free-marthose already mentioned.
ket (neo-liberal) policies that benefit, above othI would be interested to hear from you how
ers, the wealthy, the multi-national corporations,
different North’s approach is from that of Hazlitt,
and the financiers, who often do their utmost to
whose book, which he has re-written, was the
avoid paying any tax at all, let alone the minimal
stimulus for your review. You clearly say that
amount they seem to pay.
North takes Hazlitt’s libertarian work and puts
What unfortunately is communicated by the
it into a Christian context. You say that the book
kinds of polemics you ofhas been re-written on a
fer against government and
biblical-moral foundation
Following North, it seems,
its “intrusions” and “violainstead of a foundation in
you
speak
negatively
of
the
tions” is support for those
humanistic pragmatism.
government multiple times,
who seek to avoid contribThose who follow Kuyper
and Dooyeweerd would
using such terms as “intrusions,” uting to the public coffers
to fund the activities of
question whether a liber“excessive intrusions,” or
government, while the extarian work can be used
“violation of property rights.”
tremes of their wealth sits
as the basis for a Christian
alongside the economic
approach without doing sehardship and struggles of millions in the same
rious distortion to both. Frankly, the presupposisociety who have to do without adequate food,
tions and approach taken by libertarian econoclothing, employment, education, shelter and
mists are hardly compatible with a biblical view
health care, to mention but a few of their needs.
of life. Is this then not just another instance of the
Can you not see that the constant reiteration
fallacy of synthesis thinking, in which secular huof the theme that anything governments do in
manistic views are melded with biblical concepts
relation to the economy is “intervention” or “ininto a mixture of iron and clay? Such a synthetrusion” contributes to a denigration of governsis cannot be authentically either humanistic or
ment per se and fosters not positive civil virtues
Christian. While North and others of that school
in citizens but fear and suspicion? I struggled to
are more than happy to critique the foundational
find anything positive said about government in
principles of socialists and Marxists, they seem
North’s book. There seems to be a Manichean
strangely reticent to apply the same depth of crispirit running through his works, which makes
tique to the foundational principles of capitalism
government (in any form, since it seems that all
(and not just the pragmatistic avoidance of mohe can say about government is to attack its every
rality). It raises the question as to why North did
action as “intrusion”) something to be feared and
not write a book from scratch instead of adopting
resisted, while an economy free from regulation
and adapting one originating from an unbiblical
is extolled as good and desirable. For North, it
perspective.
seems, taxation is always “theft.” Can there be
The differences between North and the
any good thing done by government (apart from
Kuyperian tradition can be seen, for instance,
protecting the economy from any interference)
in the latter’s approach to the Bible, in which
and can any form of taxation be anything but
the task of government is understood positively.
“theft”? It seems not from what you say.
North objects to government “intrusion” into
Perhaps you could provide a positive dethe social order. Following North, it seems, you
scription of the task of government, which is
speak negatively of the government multiple
“God’s servant for your good” (Romans 13:4).
times, using such terms as “intrusions,” “excesCan there be a legitimate government that does
sive intrusions,” or “violation of property rights.”
more than the barest possible minimum (whatSuch polemics are unhelpful when what we need
ever that minimum)? Can you explain why the
to know is how we should understand the proper
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Scriptures throughout speak of God’s relationship to the creation and the people within it in
political terms—God “rules”; he is “King”; he
issues laws—if government is so lacking in legitimacy? Surely disparaging government is to
speak slightingly of the King not only who gives
us government but who also adopts that imagery
for his own relationship with us (not exclusively,
of course, but extensively).
The focus for those who take a different line,
more closely aligned with that of Kuyper, is not
the extent to which government engages with society (as if there were a simple measure of more
or less, with the “correct” level somewhere on
that scale) but the appropriateness of the engagement that should take place. There is no doubt
that there is an appropriate task for government
in Christian political theory and practice. In addition to the clear teaching of Scripture in which
government is spoken of as God’s servant, it is
also clear that the phenomenon of government is
grounded in the creation order, as there is nothing
that can exist save that which has been provided
for by God in his order for creation. This is so,
despite the fact that government (and every other
area of life) has been distorted and contaminated
by human sin—the creational order in which it is
founded still remains in place, sustained by God
in every way. Were there no basis in the creation
order for the phenomenon of government, then it
could not exist. Clearly, then, government is not
merely legitimate but helpful for us. That many
governments around the world are tyrannical,
despotic, or otherwise corrupt does not detract
from the fact that government is a gift from God
for the good of humankind. It is the way it is used
and abused that needs correction, and all too often we find that it is rampant, free-market capitalism through neo-liberal ideology which props
up the worst forms of government around the
world for its own economic benefit. It has been
said of some of the repressive anti-democratic
dictatorships which imposed free-market ideology while engaged in brutality against unions or
others who protested the actions of the government, that “people had to be imprisoned so that
the market could be free.”
You say that compassion for the poor is not
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compatible with government-forced redistribution, and that this is theft in violation of the commandment “You shall not steal.” At this point
your support for minimal government, minimal
tax (if any), and no redistribution simply undercuts any claim to be presenting a Christian
faithful concern for the whole of society, not just
for those who have managed to secure massive
amounts of wealth. You suggest that compassion
for the poor and distribution of funds should be
voluntary. Unfortunately, this is not what we find
with the massively wealthy—they do not support
the poor. In fact their wealth is often garnered
through enterprises which pay wages so low it is
almost impossible to live on them, and from manipulating their finances to minimise whatever
taxes they cannot completely avoid. The kinds
of political and economic views you espouse
here are of one piece with those who advocate
rampant neo-liberal free-market economics and
are a poor reflection of the depth and richness
of insight into economic and political realities
which has been presented by the various authors
mentioned above (along with others I have not
mentioned).
The focus on “theft” seems to arise from
North’s contention that the eighth commandment, “You shall not steal,” is the principal basis
for any sound economic perspective. This seems
to place far too great a burden on a few words
(four in English, two in Hebrew). There are many
more substantive discussions of economic life in
the Old Testament, which surely indicate that
economics goes far beyond simply a proscription
of theft and exaltation of property rights. And to
extend that proscription to rejection of the right
of governments to raise funds by taxation is simply unsupportable by sound exegesis. This fact
can be seen even more starkly in North’s claim in
his book that the sin of Adam and Eve in taking
the fruit of the tree was a breach of the prohibition against theft—in fact he says that this first
prohibition in the Bible is the prohibition against
theft and promotion of property rights. This view
is simply astonishing. Surely the sin of Adam and
Eve involves more than theft? That this is not
a misreading of North is confirmed by the fact
that he makes the same comment three times in

his book, each time expressing the view that the
sin of Adam and Eve was theft. While they did
steal the fruit, what was involved was not simply
a breach of God’s property rights (which is what
North makes it seem) but a life-encompassing
breach of covenant, which affected Adam and
Eve in every way. Their sin was a religious change
of orientation of the heart away from obedience
to God towards a false authority, a false pretence
to autonomy, which established idolatry at their
very core. Seeing it simply as “theft” fails to do
justice to the depth and extent of their disobedience.
It would be of interest to those who follow
Kuyper’s line to know more about your reasons
for considering Gary North to be consistent in applying the Scriptures to economics, and whether
you consider Goudzwaard, Skillen and Storkey
to be inconsistent, ivory-tower thinkers, along
with Kuyper. Surely you have not dismissed their
views in a cavalier manner without considering
their work carefully, but since their views are not
compatible with those of Gary North, I would be
interested to hear what it is exactly that you find
unsatisfying in their approach.

You have commended North’s book to any
interested Christian who wants to be a responsible citizen and an obedient child of God in all
areas of life. For the reasons given above, I suggest that rather than a biblically faithful presentation of political and economic life, North’s book
presents a narrow, constricted, and suspect perspective that fails to do adequate justice to the
breadth and depth of life in all its complexity or
to the drastic consequences of sin in all its horror
and power. It does not present a vision that opens
up Christian discipleship in all of life, but to the
contrary, it distorts the teaching of Scripture in
significant ways and reduces its view of economics to a very constricted vision. There are many
books by other Christian authors that do a much
more effective job in presenting the calling for
faithfulness to God in all of life and specifically
for economics. I would encourage you to give
them due consideration and reflect on the limitations they expose in the approach taken by
North.
Yours in Christ,
Chris Gousmett
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Reply to Dr. Chris Gousmett’s
Open Letter

by Sacha Walicord
Dear Dr. Gousmett,
Let me begin by thanking you for taking the
time to write a review of my review, so to speak.
I have to say that I find it a little difficult to reply
to your extensive letter because it is filled with innuendos, platitudes, and very loose references to
Scripture without cogent, exegetically-sound arguments. It is clear that you do not like the freemarket view and that you prefer the approach
of forced governmental redistribution when it
comes to social issues. To answer all your claims
and assumptions would require an extensive reply for which, frankly, I neither have time nor
enough space in this publication. Therefore, I
will try to reply in a more general way.
Please allow me to provide a short excerpt of
my biography before I answer some of your conDr. Sacha Walicord is Associate Professor of Business
Administration at Dordt College.
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cerns to help you understand my views.
Raised in Europe, I was indoctrinated with
statism and “big government socialism” from an
early age. This happened in school, through the
media, and through many other venues. We were
constantly told how great it was to have government provide everything we needed. It was often
added how evil the U.S. social system was and
that people there were dying outside of hospitals
due to lack of finances and the absence of public health insurance. Growing up, I believed all
of this because it was all I had ever heard. Not
once can I remember even hearing a critical view
of such a worldview and essentially grew up a
Marxist. I promoted and defended this view.
When I was confronted with the saving Gospel
of Jesus Christ and became a believer in my midteens, I began to see the world and everything in
it with new eyes. This was, of course, a long process, but essentially, I came to understand the antithesis, the incompatibility of light with darkness,
of the world with the Kingdom of God. Through
this, I learned that I had to rigorously re-think
everything in biblical terms. I had been made new
in the eyes of God through Jesus Christ, and this
“newness” had to play out in every single area of
my life and thinking—or to say it in Dr. Kuyper’s
great words, in “every square inch” of my existence. As I went through university, law school,
and later graduate school, this antithesis between
the world and God’s Kingdom became even
clearer to me, and I learned that classrooms are
a battlefield for the minds of future generations.
I was forced to decide either to push back or to
abandon my Christian convictions. In line with

gether is expressly wrong and a blatant misrepremy conscience, I decided to push back. Later,
sentation of the truth. Furthermore, you claim
as an economics professor, I had to search for a
that we were proponents of humanist libertaribiblical view of economics. I quickly understood
anism, which is utterly ludicrous because North
that God’s Word assigned very limited powers
states exactly the opposite at length in his book
to government, but I still needed more clarity
(see Preface, Introduction, and Chapter 1!), as
on the matter. To be perfectly honest, I did not
do I expressly in my book review. North goes to
find this clarity among colleagues of your pergreat lengths to explain Hazlitt’s weaknesses and
suasion—not at all. I found among them, what
the fallacy of humanist libertarianism. I have no
seemed to me, little to no commitment to sola
problem with discussing opposing views, but I do
scriptura and a strong presuppositional, faith-like
not appreciate misrepresencommitment to both theotations of views and strawlogical and political liberalIt seems to me that your entire
man arguments. Moreover,
ism. This, of course, is only
letter seeks to build a strawman
I was quite surprised to read
my very subjective percepargument, with secular “robberthe following statement in
tion, but I did not see them
baron-capitalism” on one
your letter: “Frankly, the
defending the integrity of
side and an infallible “oh-sopresuppositions and apScripture against secular
proach taken by libertaronslaughts. On the concompassionate and selfless”
ian economists are hardly
trary, it seemed to me that
government on the other.
compatible with a biblical
for them the enemy was
view of life. Is this then not
not theological liberalism
another instance of the fallacy of synthesis thinkbut theologically conservative, Bible-believing
ing, in which secular humanists views are meldChristians, whom they would often condescended with biblical concepts into a mixture of iron
ingly call “fundamentalists,” “prooftexters,” or
and clay?” You are absolutely correct, but what
“biblicists.” It seemed to me that they would deis your purpose in telling me this? Both North
fend their views not with sound biblical exegesis
and I (even in my short review) have in clearest
but with lofty philosophical jargon, which the
terms distanced ourselves from a humanist libaverage Christian in the pew would never be able
ertarianism. In fact, that is what North’s book
to follow. It looked as though they were seekis all about, to defend the free market as biblical
ing to constitute something like a “new priestand not from a humanist standpoint (have you
hood” or a theological “uber-class,” which “ordireally read the book?). And yet, I do have to ask
nary” Christians and pastors needed in order to
you why you do not express a similar warning
understand the complex teachings of Scripture.
against statism/socialism in your letter. After all
Reading your letter, and considering the derogayou seem to find it necessary to point out several
tory emails that were written to my superiors and
times that you are not of the socialist persuasion.
colleagues by your like-minded friends, without
Help me understand how your own statist view,
including me in the discussion, in reaction to my
for which at no point you provide a coherent biblittle book review, I have to admit that it certainly
lical defense, is not—to put it again in your own
feels like the mindset I just described. It appears
words—“another instance of the fallacy of synthat a difference of opinion—especially pubthesis thinking, in which secular humanist views
licly—is not taken well by proponents of your
are melded with biblical concepts into a mixture
persuasion.
of iron and clay?”
In regards to the content of your letter, I have
It seems to me that your entire letter seeks to
to admit that I was taken aback by the incoherbuild a strawman argument, with secular “robence of your argument and your almost disingenber-baron-capitalism” on one side and an infaluous misrepresentations of Dr. North’s and my
lible “oh-so-compassionate and selfless” governown views. To give you an example, your claim
ment on the other. Then you attack this made-up,
that we were against taxes and government altoPro Rege—March 2018
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quasi-capitalist position and immediately claim
victory. In agreement, I do not like the strawman-capitalism that you describe, but the utopian
statism/socialism that you present as a solution
cannot exist as it is in stark conflict with human
nature. Fallen man will not suddenly become
perfect and selfless as soon as he becomes a government redistributor of other people’s wealth. If
you give fallen humans unbridled power of the
sword, they will abuse it every time. Statism and
socialism were never about compassion for the
poor but about power for the elite and bureaucrats, who want to control every area of people’s
lives—or to say it in Gideon J. Tucker’s famous
words, “No man’s life, liberty, or property is safe
while the legislature is in session.”
Also, your use of isolated passages of Scripture
(prooftexting?) is quite troubling to me. In typical liberal manner you keep calling for “sound
exegesis,” but you do not provide any—even remotely sound—biblical exegesis yourself. In fact,
you seem to quote Kuyper more than Scripture,
and even then, you are more trying to interpret
his views in your favor than actually quote him.
You use Scripture where it fits your argument
but revert to lofty philosophical jargon and appeal to emotion where Scripture does not support
your views—when you repeatedly and in quite
dramatic fashion refer to the plight of the poor,
seeking to make your case for big government by
appealing to the readers’ emotions. Furthermore,
you use Romans 13:4 to make the case for extensive government responsibility as government’s
being “God’s minister to you for good” while not
allowing the rest of the passage to explain just
what precisely this “good” is—only because it
does not seem to fit your argument. That is not
exegesis but eisegesis—you are trying to force
your own preferences unto the text of Scripture.
Thereby you are neglecting a fundamental principle of Reformed biblical interpretation, namely
to let Scripture interpret Scripture. It is this very
passage (Romans 13) that explains what this
“good” is, but you fill the term with your own
preferences. If you want to allow a government to
extend its power to whatever government thinks
is “good,” you have clearly opened the door to all
sorts of tyranny. The argument of tyrannical gov36
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ernments and dictatorships throughout history
has always been, “We know what is good for you.”
You seem to make the opposite case, that the free
market view with a very limited government is
prone to oppression and tyranny. Accordingly,
you write, “It has been said of some of the repressive anti-democratic dictatorships which imposed
free-market ideology while engaged in brutality
against unions or others who protested the actions of the government, that people had to be
imprisoned so that the market could be free.” Do
you understand the self-defeating nature of your
own argument here? Take note how your statement begins! It begins with the words “repressive
anti-democratic dictatorships.” Dictatorships are
governments...the same institution that North
and I say must be limited in its power and which
you want empowered to run society for us.
As one reads your letter, you sound increasingly hostile to wealthy/productive people. At
some point you write “[Y]ou suggest that compassion for the poor and distribution of funds
should be voluntary. Unfortunately, this is not
what we find with the massively wealthy—
they do not support the poor.” May I ask how
you justify such a blank statement? Is there any
sound data to back up such a conclusion, or is
this just another speculation on your behalf?
Furthermore, I wonder why the default mode in
your circles seems to be to call on Caesar to help
the poor and not to call the church to pick up her
God-ordained diaconal duty. I think this is quite
telling. God calls us, as Christians, to care for the
poor. He does not call us to call on the government
to care for the poor. As one reads your letter, one
cannot help but observe that you revert more and
more into a language of class warfare with “the
(evil) wealthy” on one side and “the (good) poor”
on the other. This is, of course, a false dichotomy
and seeks to stir up emotions rather than state
facts. Such an emotionalized argument builds on
a breach of the Tenth Commandment and seeks
to stir people’s emotions against a group of people based on their income and not based on their
moral quality. This strategy is highly divisive and
wrong.
In your letter you continuously mention the
names of your favorite scholars and criticize me

for not mentioning them. This is a rather strange
criticism since I was reviewing a book by Gary
North. Why would I then mention Goudzwaard,
Skillen, Storkey, and others? I like much of Dr.
Goudzwaard’s criticism of Marxism in his 1972
ICS lectures, but these men are not the ones I
would go to for sound biblical economic solutions. Also, since you are complaining about my
ignoring them, let me ask you why these and
other like-minded thinkers have never (at least to
my knowledge) published an objection to Gary
North’s extensive publications on the topic of
biblical economics? North has published a comprehensive economic commentary on the Bible,
which is available free of charge on the internet.
He has been criticizing these men’s economic approach in print for over 50 years. Where is the
response? I am not aware of any, but I might be
wrong.
Let me unequivocally express that I will continue to teach my students whatever approach I
find in God’s Word. At the end of the day it is
not Kuyper, Dooyeweerd, or North that we will
all be accountable to but to the God of the Bible.
Over the years it has become clear to me without a shadow of a doubt that the Bible teaches
a very limited role of civil government (Rom.
13:1-7 etc.) and a strong protection of private
property (Ex. 20:15, Matt. 20:15, Acts 5:4 etc.).
Furthermore, I do believe in the validity of taxes as long as they are under 10 percent (1 Sam.
8:10, 14) and as long as they are used for tasks
assigned to the civil government in God’s Word.
Therefore, whatever civil government is authorized to take according to God’s Word is not theft
and whatever civil government is authorized and
called to do according to God’s Word is not sinful intrusion. My question for you would be this:
can the government ever steal, or is this by your
definition of government impossible because it is,
well,…the government? In that case we will have
to change the commandment from “Thou shalt
not steal” to “Thou shalt not steal—with the exception of government” or “Thou shalt not steal
—except by majority vote.”

I am always stunned that as some colleagues
in academia seem to be more than willing to accept grants, donations, and salaries from capitalist donors and parents, while at the same time
they try to indoctrinate the very same capitalists’
children with statist and socialist ideas—especially those from biblically conservative families.
That, to me, is the peak of hypocrisy and dishonesty. It has become so en vogue to push socialism and other liberal causes in academia that
not being inclined to do such often means not to
be taken seriously as an academic. Everyone, it
seems, who dares to object will be shouted down,
intimidated, and slandered. I learned that again
with my short book review in Pro Rege, and yet I
will not be intimidated.
In closing, I would like to leave you with my
most important appeal. Critical to our families,
churches, schools, and cherished institutions is
the fact that our Reformed heritage, which stems
from an unwavering faithfulness to the Word
of God, must be renewed in every generation.
Constantly, we must battle against compromise
in regards to our historic faith, lest liberalism
creep in, which, unabated will always end in
apostasy in the next generation. Our very college
is named after the great Dutch synod of 1618,
when our Christian ancestors valiantly stood
against the theological errors of their day. Four
hundred years later, the battle has remained unchanged for us.
Thank you again, for interacting with me
through Pro Rege. I am afraid that this exchange
could easily develop into an endless back-andforth between us. Therefore, in case you insist
on continuing this exchange, I would be open to
a friendly formal debate with you on our campus if a sponsor for such a debate can be found.
Whatever disagreements you might have with
Dr. North, I encourage you to take up with him.
Considering that we are talking only about a
simple book review, we have already invested a
lot of time and words.
Every blessing!
Rev. Sacha Walicord, Ph.D.
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BOOK REVIEWS
The Lost World of the Israelite Conquest. John H. Walton and J. Harvey Walton. Downer’s Grove,
Illinois: Intervarsity Press Academic, 2017. 288pp. ISBN: 978-0830851843. Reviewed by Justin Bailey,
Assistant Professor of Theology, Dordt College.
John Walton’s first two “Lost World” books
aimed to illuminate the opening chapters of
the Bible. Convinced that the rich imaginative
universe of the biblical writers is often occluded
in contemporary debates about human origins,
Walton sought to supply the “ancient cognitive
environment” that gets lost in translation. Both
books were popular and provocative, challenging
modern assumptions about the Genesis account
as well as the larger project of Old Testament
interpretation. Walton’s burden is to remind
modern readers that the strangeness of Scripture
demands our respect. His careful work with
Ancient Near Eastern sources often reveals the
vast distance between the biblical text and our
modern outlook, even as it seeks to build bridges
for our understanding.
For this third book in what has become
an unintended “Lost World” series, J. Harvey
Walton (son of John Walton) takes aim at the
Israelite conquest of Canaan, as described in the
biblical book of Joshua, with the elder Walton
in a consulting and editorial role. The authors’
basic argument is that modern interpreters have
misunderstood and misapplied these texts in
Joshua. This is the case for cultured despisers of
religion, who condemn the conquest as genocide,
as well as for Christian apologists, who legitimize
the conquest as divine judgment. The interpretive
failure, the authors opine, is multi-dimensional.
Lacking a proper picture of what the Bible is (an
ancient document), we adjudicate the text by
modern conceptions of progress and goodness.
Ignoring the literary intent of Canaanite depiction,
we judge the Canaanites as “doomed for their sin.”
Lacking historical appreciation of ancient conquest
narratives, we miss the literary and theological
significance of Joshua’s genre. Lacking a nuanced
conceptualization of the key word kherem (Joshua
2:10, 6:17-18), we mistranslate it as “utterly
38
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destroy” instead of “remove from use.”
The authors argue that what is actually
happening in the Canaanite conquest narratives
recapitulates the creation account in Genesis:
the establishment of cosmos from chaos, the
institution of order in a non-ordered realm, and
the clearing of a space in which God can dwell
with his people. In other words, the Waltons
do not attempt to construct an apology for the
conquest so much as situate it within its ancient
context. The authors argue that portrayals of the
Canaanites fit an ancient trope, borne out by
other sources, that of the “invincible barbarians”
who must be expelled. This is a literary device
used to demonstrate that the land is not procured
by the might of the Israelites alone, but by divine
assistance. The need to justify the conquest of the
Israelites, they point out, is not felt by the ancient
author: “The Canaanites are being destroyed
by Yahweh because that is always the destiny
of invincible barbarians” (147). Thus readings
of the conquest as commensurate to Canaanite
evil miss the point just as much as readings that
paint the conquest as genocide. Both are poor
interpretations of what is actually going on in the
book of Joshua.
Although Israel’s compliance with the kherem
command did involve military violence, the
authors argue that the concept is neither implicitly
nor comprehensively destructive. Understood
in context, it has to do with the clarifying of
covenantal identity: its purpose was to “forfeit
the right to administer the territory and instead
turn the site over to the deity for the deity’s
own use” (240). Thus the modern application
of this has “nothing to do with killing people,”
for in the new covenant, “the element of land is
recapitulated by the believers themselves” (239240). In the final chapter, the authors seek to
draw a parallel between the kherem command and

the mortification passages in the New Testament
(Romans 6:3-4, Galatians 5:24, Colossians 3:89). To practice kherem in a new covenant context
means to de-center our prior identities and to
re-center on the covenant community in Christ.
Rather than taking over territory or pronouncing
judgment on those outside our covenantal
community, Christians kherem themselves, “not
as a punishment but to make space for God to
carry out his purposes through their lives” (252).
I take the positive contributions of this
volume to be twofold. First, the authors provide a
plausible alternative for kherem that is worthy of
consideration. Here, kherem signifies the removal
of Canaanite identities from use in the land so
that the land and the people in the land may
be co-identified with Yahweh. In the authors’
assessment, this process includes not just military
conquest but also conversion (e.g. Rahab is an
example of kherem, not an exception to it).
Second, the authors illuminate the conquest
narratives by placing them alongside other
ancient conquest accounts. To call descriptions of
the conquest “hyperbolic” is not exactly accurate,
since these narratives belong to a specific ancient
genre that seeks a particular perlocutionary effect.
The recognition of these contexts give coherence
to the conquest accounts so that we are able to
appreciate the literary and theological significance
of what is being narrated in Joshua, rather than
starting with questions that are foreign to the text.
Nevertheless, many readers may feel that the
authors’ systematic dismantling of the traditional
interpretation of the conquest is strained. The
Waltons argue that depictions of Canaanite
evil are intended to critique Israel rather than
condemn the Canaanites, and they claim that
the conquest narratives are concerned with
driving out the forces of chaos and establishing
cosmological order rather than with judging
sin. Yet, in both cases, it is difficult to see why it
cannot be all of the above. That the authors are
accurate in what they affirm does not necessarily
rule out what they deny.
As the work of two authors, The Lost World
of the Israelite Conquest is both like and unlike
the earlier two “Lost World” volumes by John
Walton. It is built on the same interpretive

assumptions and follows the same basic method.
Structurally, it organizes its argument around
twenty-one propositions, each of which stands as
the title of short chapters that cumulatively make
the case. This can be a benefit to most readers:
the sometimes dense material is mitigated by the
efficiency of each chapter’s aim. The argument,
thus constructed, is relatively easy to follow.
At the same time, this third volume is also
unlike the earlier volumes: largely penned by the
younger Walton, the prose is less practiced, and
this less-practiced prose sometimes pulls the book
towards overly ambitious pronouncements. That,
together with the elder Walton’s interpretive
minimalism, results in a reading of the conquest
that is simultaneously spare in its interpretations
of particular texts and provocative in its larger
interpretive project.
Indeed, what makes the volume most
potentially problematic is not the revisionary
approach to the Israelite conquest but the
methodological denials that are made along
the way. The authors take aim at many targets
tangential to their task, such as Christopher
Wright’s missiology (Israel is not “expected to
bring the nations into the covenant” [75]), Walt
Kaiser’s principlizing hermeneutics (principles
are extracted from their context so as to become
“essentially arbitrary” [95]), and any number of
attempts to derive ethics from Scripture (God’s
purpose in giving us Scripture “does not include
teaching us to be moral”[98]).
With chapters as short and pithy as they are,
these dismissals cannot help but resemble straw
men. The authors seem to indicate that most
attempts to move from the Bible to theology
are misguided, even as they advance their own
proposal in the book’s final chapter, an attempt
that in practice is difficult to distinguish from any
number of hermeneutical approaches on offer
(including Kaiser’s!).
Indeed, the desire to distance their approach
from moralism leads to some strange conclusions,
such as this: “We must not conflate the Bible’s
status and function as Scripture with its status
and function as literature. Providing us with
moral knowledge is not its purpose as Scripture;
consequently, any moral knowledge we can derive
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from it does not carry the authority of Scripture,
but rather only the authority of human wisdom”
(100). I am simply not sure how to understand
statements like this. That divinely-inspired
moral direction can and should be derived from
Scripture is the testimony of the Great Tradition
and, more notably, of Scripture itself (2 Timothy
3:16). In the authors’ effort to ensure that we
mind the gap between the ancient context and
our own, I worry that they are in danger of
leaving us with Lessing’s “ugly ditch” between
history and faith.
Perhaps the difficulties I found with
the volume may be no more than those of
a theologian wanting to bring canonical
theology to bear on biblical specialists who are
zealous for close readings of particular texts.
But hard disjunctions seem methodologically
commonplace throughout this volume. We are
given a picture of striking discontinuity between
the testaments, between holiness and morality,
and between creation and covenant. On the last
pair, the authors write, “When the Israelites are
unfaithful to the Torah, they are not breaking
God’s universal moral law; they are breaking the
covenant” (103). Why not both? Does not the

covenant reveal something about the character of
the Creator and the grooves of creation? Related
to this is the authors’ repeated insistence that the
Canaanites cannot be depicted as guilty since
they are not in covenantal relationship with
Yahweh. Does not Yahweh’s sovereignty extend to
the nations? Shall not the judge of all the earth
do what is right by the Canaanites, just as surely
as by the inhabitants of Sodom (Genesis 18:25)?
This may not be an immediate concern of the
world of the text, but isn’t it a concern we must
address as we live in front of the text? And surely
the larger canonical context has something to
say on God’s relationship with the nations, the
accountability and guilt of all humanity, and the
general contours of God’s design for flourishing.
These canonical dimensions do not replace the
meaning of ancient texts in their context, but
they do fill them in sometimes surprising ways.
In the end, this volume advances the
conversation on the conquest narratives in some
important ways. As a part of the Waltons’ larger
project in restoring lost worlds of meaning, it is
a gift to interpreters. The question is whether the
methodological underpinnings of their approach
can sustain the weight placed upon them.

The Disruption of Evangelicalism: The Age of Torrey, Mott, McPherson and Hammond. Treloar, Geoffrey
R. Downers Grove, Illinois: InterVarsity Press, 2017. 335 pp. ISBN: 978-0830825844. Reviewed by
Keith Sewell, Emeritus Professor of History, Dordt College.
Covering the period between 1900 and 1940,
The Disruption of Evangelicalism is the fourth
book in InterVarsity Press’ series titled “A History
of Evangelicalism: People, Movements, and Ideas
in the English-Speaking World.” Once the series
ends with the eventual publication of the fifth
volume, some will see the series as completing the
development in evangelical history-writing that
began with George Marsden’s The Evangelical
Mind and the New School Presbyterian Experience
(1970). This book’s author, Geoffrey Treloar, is
director of learning and teaching at the Australian
College of Theology, Sydney. He is an authority
on the historiography of the New Testament
scholar Joseph Barber Lightfoot (1828-89).
In this fourth volume, Treloar’s subject is
English-speaking evangelicalism in the period
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following the high points of the nineteenth
century and the post-1945 era of the Billy
Graham Crusades. This period was marked
by what Treloar labels as “disruption.” It was a
time when the previously unresolved problems
within evangelicalism were not only not resolved
but became more fully apparent. These include
evangelicalism’s inadequate ecclesiology, its
tendency towards cultural superficiality, and its
intellectual deficiencies, all of which were already
manifested in the nineteenth century and, in
the early decades of the twentieth century, came
home to roost.
While not offering “potted biographies” as
such, Treloar finds exemplars of these divergent
tendencies in the lives and work of Reuben A.
Torrey (1856-1928), John R. Mott (1865-1955),

Aimee Semple McPherson (1890-1944) and
T.C. Hammond (1877-1961). The first three
are well known to many American evangelicals
and well reflect the North American dominance
of evangelicalism worldwide in the twentieth
century (17). Hammond is the odd one out, an
Irishman who is among those responsible for
the strongly protestant and Reformed character
of the Anglican Diocese of Sydney in Australia
(199-200).
The three North Americans all share with
Hammond an important quality: they all
anticipate leaders and developments that were
to be prominent in the post-1945 era. R. A.
Torrey looks back to Dwight L. Moody, but in
his global outreach he anticipates J. Edwin Orr
and especially Billy Graham and his Evangelistic
Association, founded in 1950. Similarly, the
fascinating figure of John Mott, the grand
strategist of global missions at the time of the
1910 World Missionary Conference held in
Edinburgh, can be seen as anticipating the phase
of the ecumenical movement that commenced
with the World Council of Churches gathering at
Amsterdam in 1948.
Even more prescient is the controversial
figure of Aimee Semple McPherson. As a
celebrity-revivalist Pentecostal, McPherson was
in many respects a harbinger of the charismatic,
revivalist mega-church enterprises of the late
twentieth century. Treloar refers to her “creative
use of modern communication technologies,
entertainment[,] and spectacle” (216). Acting
on the assumption that music and technology
are religiously neutral, this strain of revivalist
evangelicalism has promoted mega-churches
whose apparent success is actually attributable
to their aping of contemporary pop-culture with
its narcissistic mores. For the time being, their
attendance figures are generally seen as indications
of success; yet they are not the solution to everincreasing secularisation but a mark of it, even as
they drain the life out of many a faltering local
congregation.
A mark of this entire series is its indebtedness
to the famous evangelical “quadrilateral of
priorities,” as defined by David Bebbington:
“conversionism,” (the belief that lives need to

be changed), “activism” (the energetic advocacy
of the gospel), “Biblicism” (an emphatic
commitment to the Bible), and “crucicentrism”
(a strong emphasis on the sacrifice of Christ
on the cross). This formula guides Treloar also;
however, recognising the disruptive stresses and
strains impacting evangelicalism in this era, he
argues that the biblicist-crucicentric emphasis
became more dominant in the early twentieth
century (6-7, 192, 201, 226).
Of course, the deeper problem was that the
over-emphasis of the “quadrilateral of priorities” in
the life of evangelicalism left it deeply vulnerable
on a variety of fronts. Evangelicalism lacked an
integral basis. As I have argued elsewhere, this
left evangelicalism with serious cultural and
intellectual deficits. The resulting weaknesses
were painfully exposed in the nineteenth century.
The higher critical biblical scholarship emanating
from Germany, as well as a wholly naturalistic
evolutionism, had presented evangelicalism with
challenges that it was ill equipped to surmount. All
too often, in attempting to face these challenges,
evangelicalism only ended up making faces at
them.
In this volume, Treloar ably describes an
evangelicalism past its peak influence (11), ill at
ease with political complexities (107-108), and,
after 1919, confronting an “unreceptive culture”
in which it had little or no traction (229, 245).
One of the most important portions of
Treloar’s work is where he breaks new ground in
paying close attention to evangelical responses
to the First World War and its impact (117172). From 1914 and 1917, evangelicals proved
to be remarkably susceptible to pro-war state
propaganda. Indeed, the level of evangelical
cultural naivety could be stunning. Evangelicals
actually believed that the end of the Great War
would presage a great worldwide revival—an
expectation that was utterly unfounded and
soon dashed. They seemed to have little insight
into the spiritually wasting impact of protracted
battlefield carnage. If they had consulted the
autobiographical writings of Richard Baxter
(1615-1691), they would have known better.
The willingness of evangelicals to sign up to a
“war for righteousness” and their all too frequent
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acceptance of the supposedly “neutral” features of
contemporaneous western culture serve to raise
confronting questions about the entire sequence.
One problem with this series, including
Treloar’s book, is that it is light on the overall
relationship of evangelicalism with its surrounding
culture. Why?
Arguably, the answer lies in the point of
departure exhibited across the entire five volume
series. These volumes are written from within
the perspective of evangelicalism itself. As a
consequence, the series tacitly assumes the validity
of the reductionism implicit in Bebbington’s
“quadrilateral.” It views evangelicalism from
within and according to this frame of reference.
To make the point in another way, this series
is valuable in that it provides an insight into
how some evangelicals now view the history of
evangelicalism on its own terms.
That said, after reading this series, we

are left asking the following question: How
different would it be if we were to abandon a
historiography of evangelicalism as here restricted
by the reductionism implicit in the “Bebbington
quadrilateral” and re-write the story from the
standpoint that all of life is to be lived Coram Deo,
before the face of God? In other words, how would
the structure of the narrative change if we were
to critically reassess the history of evangelicalism
from a standpoint that acknowledges that Christ’s
call to discipleship—“Follow Me”—knows
no limits, no sacred / secular dichotomies or
intellectual boundaries, and includes every lawful
calling and human activity?
If we were to take this step, we could acquire a
sharper view of our history as the people of God
in the world, of our calling as we confront our
current predicament, and of the challenges that
will soon be upon us.

Calvin’s Political Theology and the Public Engagement of the Church: Christ’s Two Kingdoms. Tuininga,
Matthew J. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017. 386 pp. ISBN: 978-1-10717143-5. Reviewed by Keith Sewell, Emeritus Professor of History, Dordt College.
Calvin’s Political Theology and the Public
Engagement of the Church: Christ’s Two Kingdoms
is an important work. Matthew Tuininga is
Assistant Professor of Moral Theology at Calvin
Theological Seminary. This book is not a “quick
read.” It requires a sustained effort across more
than nine full chapters, and although Tuininga’s
readers will learn much from him, they will need
to study this work with every critical faculty keenly
engaged and be fully alert to the fraught interplay
between envisioning Calvin sympathetically in
his context, and using his work and reputation in
order to validate the “two kingdoms” thinking of
certain later reformed thinkers.
The current resurgence of “two kingdoms”
thinking owes much to David VanDrunen’s A
Biblical Case for Natural Law (2006) and Natural
Law and the Two Kingdoms (2010). These works
confirm the continuing strength of scholasticism
in some circles. VanDrunen is the Robert B.
Strimple Professor of Systematic Theology at
Westminster Theological Seminary, Escondido,
CA. VanDrunen’s early work was on Thomas
42
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Aquinas. Tuininga’s work is that of a disciple of
VanDrunen (viii, 19).
This book purports to be presenting Calvin
in his own terms and in his own context, but
in reality it does something else—it presents
Calvin in terms compatible with Tuininga’s
and VanDrunen’s commitment to their “two
kingdoms” standpoint. In short, while Tuininga
claims to be holding the Calvin texts and his latterday “two kingdoms” commitment apart (9), in
practice his “two kingdoms” commitment exerts
a strong gravitational pull over his discussion of
the Calvin texts. The “two kingdoms” standpoint
does not necessarily presume to set aside Christ’s
kingship over all human culture. Rather, it
makes the distinction between the church as an
institution, and the surrounding culture in which
it is situated, so sharply that the terminology of
“two kingdoms” becomes a matter of course. As a
consequence, it may be inferred, or even asserted,
that the followers of Jesus Christ have and share
much in common with the thinking and conduct
of unbelievers.

Accordingly, while Tuininga does not set
out to defend liberal democracy, he is keen
to demonstrate how, what he repeatedly calls
“Calvin’s two kingdoms theology,” offers
Christians a way of understanding how they
might participate in contemporary liberal
democracies that they do not control (3-5, 322).
To this end, Tuininga provides his readers with a
full overview of Calvin’s reformation setting (2360), and the attempted reformation in France (6191), as prelude to a detailed discussion of Calvin’s
teachings on the kingdom of Christ, its spiritual
character, covenant and law, the responsibilities
of the civil magistrate, and resistance to tyranny
(92-354). This is the backbone of the book, and
the reader will find here much that is instructive
and worthy of further reflection.
At the same time, he or she will need to
be fully alert. A key difficulty is that Tuininga
repeatedly insists on finding Calvin’s “two
kingdoms theology” in passages where Calvin
does not use that terminology himself. The result
is misleading, and readers would be well advised
to check passage after passage for themselves.
For example, Tuininga states that “Calvin’s two
kingdoms paradigm” pervades his discussion
of Micah 4:3 (178), but when we consult his
commentary on this—“the nations will beat
their swords into ploughshares”—passage, we
find that Calvin says “the scripture speaks of
God’s kingdom in two respects,” but nowhere
in this particular discussion does he use the
term “two kingdoms.” Similarly, with respect to
Calvin’s exposition of Joseph’s policy in Egypt as
presented in Genesis 47:22, Tuininga tells us that
“Here Calvin’s two kingdoms distinction guides
his logic”; but again Calvin does not employ any
explicit “two kingdoms” language at this juncture
(315). Perhaps a further example will suffice.
With regard to Calvin’s commentary on Romans
14:17—“the kingdom of God is not a matter
of eating and drinking, but of righteousness,
peace and joy on the Holy Spirit”—Tuininga
insists that “Calvin’s two kingdoms distinction”
is evident (157), but again, the explicit use of a
“two kingdoms” wording is not to be found.
In short, there is a serious problem here.
While Tuininga may present himself as leaving

the advocacy of this “two kingdoms” doctrine
until his conclusion (355-78), his commitment
to this doctrine greatly colors his presentation of
Calvin, to such an extent that he arguably overinterprets Calvin in his own favor. This question
must be asked: if we had never previously
encountered the “two kingdoms” doctrine at all
but had diligently studied the aforementioned
passages from Calvin’s commentaries, would we
have found that doctrine to be as ubiquitous in
Calvin as does Tuininga? The point here is not
that the use of this term is always verboten, but
that it is overemployed by Tuininga in order to
support his thesis.
At the same time it should be acknowledged
that Calvin’s thought was not free from problematic Hellenistic tendencies. His anthropology
exhibited Platonic or Neo-Platonic influences
(151-7). He had his own notion of “natural law”
(369-72), a pliable concept that may function
within a scholastic-dualistic natural/supernatural
or secular/sacred framework. The presence
of such tendencies, the legacy of centuries of
Christian intellectual accommodation that the
Reformation did not eradicate in an instant,
confirms the need to exercise caution when we
interpret and appropriate Calvin’s writings.
Of course, Calvin wrote in the Latin and
French of his day, and some translators may be
inclined to use “kingdoms” in the plural, where
others might simply use the word “twofold.” The
latter can on occasions be overly stretched to
mean “two kingdoms.” In the Ford Lewis Battles
edition of Calvin’s Institutes (1960), at Book
III.19.15, the section heading is given as “The
Two Kingdoms.” However, this expression does
not appear in the original as a heading or in the
text to which it refers. Calvin’s intention here is
to stress the “twofold” governance to which man
is subject—“duplex in homine regimen.” In his
translation of Book IV.20, Battles guides us well
by using the term “twofold” and does not employ
the term “two kingdoms.” Interpretation and
inclination are in play at such points. For example,
Elsie Anne McKee, in her fine translation of the
1541 French edition of the Institutes, (2009) uses
the term “two kingdoms in people” at the start
of chapter 16, while the original reads “deux
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regimes en l’homme,” and not specifically “deux
royaumes.”
That the kingdom has a “twofold” character,
in the sense of having come but not yet being
fully realised, is something to which Calvin often
refers, as Tuininga frequently observes (139,
179-81, 280, 358), but in Tuininga’s hands this
consideration is too readily utilized to support
his “two kingdoms” reading. By contrast, it is not
irrelevant that half a century ago the American
scholar H. Harris Harbison, in some of the most
satisfying and stimulating paragraphs written in
English on Calvin’s view of history (Christianity
and History, 1964, 279-287), focused on
Calvin’s understanding of the kingdom of God
without ever having recourse to “two kingdoms”
terminology.
While Tuininga tries to overcome the dualistic
tendency in “two kingdoms” thinking (1, 92,
182, 356), it inevitably comes to expression.
He rightly draws attention to the distinction of
the church as an institution, and the church as
the people of God, as also found in Abraham
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Kuyper (373, 375-6). However, while Tuininga
is comfortable with the church as an institution
coming to visible and corporate expression,
beyond the pale of the institutional church it is
apparently only as “individual Christians” that
we are called to witness “to the righteousness of
the kingdom” (376). Presumably there is a place
for the seminary. However, the Christian political
organisation, or the Christian university, and
much more besides, are not in contemplation.
There are issues here way beyond the scope of
this review, but many will find this approach
to be hopelessly inadequate in the face of the
increasingly strident neo-paganism evident across
the western world.
In his final book (2003), Heiko A. Oberman
lamented the baleful impact on Calvin studies
of those who oriented their research projects to
their latter-day theological agendas. He was right,
and it is also right for us to remind ourselves that
the scriptures only ever speak of one kingdom of
God.
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